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WAGE GARNISHMENT IN WASHINGTON-
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
INTRODUCTION
Consumer credit is big business in America today. Although credit
was originally extended to aid the sale of merchandise, merchandizing
has become a means of selling credit.' Total consumer installment
credit outstanding in the United States has increased from 42.832
billion dollars in 1960 to 76.223 billion in October 1967.2 At least
fifty percent of our population is now paying some form of installment
debt.3 In spite of earlier reservations,4 most businessmen now readily
agree that credit has been a boon to the economy.'
-The rising use of consumer credit, however, has an unfortunate
adjunct in the notable increase of wage garnishments. Municipal
courts throughout the country appear inundated with these actions.6
In Seattle, the district justice court processed over 15,000 writs of
'Testimony of David Caplovitz before a hearing on "Truth-in-Lending" held by
the New York Attorney General, reported in 22 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 12 (1967).253 FED. RESERVE BULL. 2122 (Dec. 1967).
'A survey conducted in early 1963 showed that 50% of the interview "spending
units" owed some installment debt. The mean debt (of the debtors) was $905. G.
KATONA, C. LININGER & E. MUELLER, 1963 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 59, 65
(1964). In 1958, the President of the National Consumer Finance Association esti-
mated that 60% of United States families use some form of consumer credit. Curtiss,
gho Uses Consumer Credit and How Much Do They Use?, 12 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP.
118, 119 (1958).
'See G. KAToNA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER 189 (1960).
'See, e.g., P. CROWN, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER 16 (1963).
"In Chicago, the Cook County Circuit Court issued 84,513 garnishments in 1965,
15% more than in 1964, and 720o more than in 1961. Court officials in New York,
Cleveland and other big cities also cite rising garnishment totals. Wall Street
Journal, March 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6. In 1965, over 12,000 garnishments were issued
by the District Court of Multnomah County, Oregon. Snedecor, Why So Many Bank-
ruptcies in Oregon?, 40 REF. J. 78, 79 (1966). The San Francisco Sheriff's Office
made more than 5,900 services in the first two months of 1965. These included 3,700
levies under writs of attachment and execution-of which 75% to 80% were wage
garnishments. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommenda-
tions, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1214 (1965). During the fiscal year 1965-66 the Los Angeles
County Marshal's Office made 127,762 attempts to levy on debtors, or persons holding
debtor's funds. Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcoinm. on Consumer Affairs
of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1036
(1967) [heinafter cited as Hearings]. In 1958 a District of Columbia judge estimated
that 1,000 garnishments a week were issued through his court. Kronheim, A Judge
Takes a Critical Look at the District of Columbia Garnishment Law, 12 PERS. FIN.
L.Q. REp. 41 (1958). One California collector estimated that his office filed 125 to 150
garnishments a month. California Assembly Interim Comm. on the Judiciary, Pro-
ceedings on Attachments-Exemption of Personal Property 40-41 (1964) (testimony
of Mr. McCarty) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. A representative of the California
Association of Collectors estimated that their law office instructed levying officers with
respect to over 1,000 attachments and executions per week. Proceedings 57 (testimony
of Mr. Wcissman).
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garnishment in 1966;' 85 percent of these were wage garnishments.8
Of course, processing papers for these numerous actions imposes
enormous clerical costs. But more significant are the burdensome
social costs resulting from wage garnishment, such as unemployment,
bankruptcy, and reinforcement of the disdain held for our courts by
a large segment of society.
With a growing awareness of these problems, state legislatures
throughout the country have been unusually active in amending their
garnishment statutes." In Washington, the garnishment statutes were
amended during the last legislative session," and additional testimony
on the subject has been received recently." The current draft of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code contains a provision limiting garnish-
ments,' 2 as does the proposed Truth in Lending Bill now before
Congress."
If adopted, the Truth in Lending Bill would supersede all incon-
sistent state laws and would apply to all garnishments.'" The bill
creates a wage exemption of thirty dollars per week plus 90 per-
cent of wages in excess of that amount. Discharge of an employee
because his wages have been garnished once is also prohibited. 6
In 1964, the Seattle District Justice Court processed 12,280 writs of garnish-
ment; in 1965 this increased to 14,332; and in 1966 to 15,624. Data provided by Chief
Civil Clerk, Seattle District Justice Court.
'A random survey of garnishment cases in the Seattle District Justice Court re-
veals that 87% of the cases sampled were wage garnishments. See note 18 infra.
' For discussions of recent statutory changes see, e.g., Lee, An Analysis of Ken-
tucky's New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618 (1967) ; Note, Wfage Garnishment as a
Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Wis. L. REv.] ; 7
WASHBURN L.J. 51 (1967). Much of the recent legislative activity has been directed
toward raising the amount of wages statutorily exempted from garnishment.
" Ch. 142, 143, [19671 Wash. Sess. Laws 903, 919.
"The Judiciary Committee of the Washington State Legislative Council held
hearings on garnishment on November 11, 1967.
'"UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT COnE §§5.104-05 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Working
Draft No. 4, 1967). See Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Con-
stoner Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 441 (1967).
. H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. 11 (1967).
" Id. § 202(a). State provisions which provide for more limited garnishments or
further restrict discharge are expressly not superseded. Id. § 204. Sec. 201 rests Con-
gressional authority for the enactment upon the commerce clause:
The Congress finds that garnishment of wages is frequently an essential ele-
ment in predatory extensions of credit and that the resulting disruption of em-
ployment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden upon
interstate commerce.
This section probably validates Congressional regulation of garnishments arising
from purely local transactions because wage garnishments exert a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
" H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202(a)(1967).
"Id. § 2 03(a). Enforcement of both sec. 202 and 203 is entrusted to the Secretary
of Labor.
[ VOL. 43 : 743
WAGE GARNISHMENT
These provisions would effect sweeping reform in state garnishment
statutes. Unfortunately, additional state provisions would be neces-
sary to avoid deficiencies in the proposed federal statute. For instance,
if state statutes did not provide for garnishment of future wages,'7
creditors who could reach only 10 percent of a debtor's wages under
the federal law might garnish a debtor's wages repeatedly week after
week. This could lead to greater employer expense and would increase
the likelihood that the debtor would be fired. The proposed statute
would not prevent such discharge because discharge is not prohibited
after the second garnishment. These and other problems will be dis-
cussed below, and statutory reforms will be recommended. These
reforms combine basic provisions of the proposed federal legislation
with other measures deemed advisable after study of the wage gar-
nishment problem.
The empirical data presented in this note were derived from studies
conducted over a period of several months by members of the Wash-
ington Law Review. The most important project in terms of time
and resource allocation was a study of 187 randomly selected case
files taken from°Seattle District Justice Court." The results of this
study are reproduced in the Appendix. Three other studies were
'Washington's garnishment provisions, for example, allow garnishment of only
those wages due at the time the writ is served. See note 29 infra and accompanying
text.
'In 1966 there were 36,000 cases filed in the Seattle District Justice Court, of
which 15,600 were garnishments. (Data provided by Chief Civil Clerk, Seattle Dis-
trict Justice Court). The high number of cases in proportion to garnishments is
accounted for by the fact that each garnishment must be accompanied by or preceded
by a main action on the underlying debt which is assigned a separate docket number.
Seeking a sample of 200 cases, 450 docket numbers from the year May 1, 1966, to
April 30, 1967, were randomly selected. The selection was made from RAND CORP., A
MLor RANDom DIGITS WITH 100,000 NoamAi DEVIATES (1955). The random digits
in the above source are arranged in groups of five in columns running down the page.
Beginning with the first page, the columns were read from top to bottom and each
group of five digits corresponding to a docket number within the year chosen was
recorded. After the docket numbers which did not represent garnishment actions and
those with hopelessly incomplete data were eliminated, the sample consisted of 187
garnishment actions. [Hereinafter cited as Justice Court Survey].
The Seattle District Justice Court is a court of limited jurisdiction with venue
corresponding to the boundaries of the city of Seattle. Seattle, Washington, in 1967
had a population of 580,000. Although the city is the hub of a large metropolitan
area extending along Puget Sound, the full spectrum of economic and social classes
may still be found within the city limits.
The state's largest private employer, the Boeing Company, has plants just south of
Seattle, and many of its employees are residents of the city. In addition, Seattle has
the normal range of light manufacturing industries. The area's economy generally
manifested a constant upward trend during the year studied, as it had during previ-
ous years. See SEATTLE-FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ANN'uAL REvIEw - SUmmARY OF
PACIFIC NORTHWEST INDUSTRIS (May, 1967). The area's population was growing
at a rate somewhat above normal, probably due to an influx of workers seeking jobs
as a result of an expansion program undertaken by the Boeing Company.
1968]
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undertaken, consisting of telephone surveys of selected groups of
collectors,1 9  employers, 2° and union representatives.2 ' The results
of these are not reproduced in tabulated form but the more signifi-
cant data are set out in the text and footnotes to this note. In addition
to these surveys, interviews were conducted with employers, union
leaders, judges, lenders, attorneys, collection agency representatives,
and staff members of the Washington State Attorney General's Office
and of the Legal Services Division of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity. It is hoped that the information derived from this research
and the conclusions based thereon will provide concerned legislators
with a beginning point for an informed review of Washington's gar-
nishment provisions.
This note follows a topical approach. The statutory framework
of wage garnishment in Washington is set forth at the outset, followed
by an analysis of the use of the remedy by creditors. A third section
of the note is concerned with the employer's role in the process; the
fourth section with the problems of debtors. Sections dealing with
the possible impact of restrictions on wage garnishment upon credit
" Twenty-seven collectors were interviewed by telephone from a prepared ques-
tionnaire. The subjects were selected from the Seattle Telephone Directory, and
although some were selected by chance, an attempt was made to include collection
agencies who frequently appeared as plaintiffs in cases in the justice court sample.
The questionnaire consisted of twenty-five questions covering four general areas:
1) the general nature of the collector's business (type of debts handled, amount of
successful collections, etc.) ; 2) the use and factors influencing the choice of using
garnishment and prejudgment garnishment; 3) nonjudicial settlement or renegotia-
tion of claims; and 4) collector attitudes toward possible revisions of the garnish-
ment statutes. The collector survey was probably the least successful of those taken,
because of the small sample and the high nonresponse rate. [Hereinafter cited as Col-
lector Survey].
' Forty-three employers were interviewed by telephone from a prepared question-
naire. The subjects were selected from STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPT. OF COMMERCE
AND EcoNo-Mic DEVELOPMENT, 1964 DIRECTORY OF WASHINGTON STATE MIANUFAcTUR-
ERS 131-43 (July, 1964). Every twenty-third name on an alphabetical list of manu-
facturers in Seattle was selected; to this was added a selected list of fourteen of the
city's largest manufacturers. The interviews were generally conducted with repre-
sentatives of the personnel departments of the larger firms, and with the owner or
manager of the smaller firms. The questionnaire consisted of thirty questions di-
vided roughly into six areas: 1) the type of employee employed by the firm; 2) the
firm's experience with wage garnishment; 3) employee attitudes and responses to
garnishment; 4) the firm's attitudes toward creditors; 5) the firm's responses to gar-
nishment and credit problems of its employees; and 6) the interviewee's attitudes
toward possible revisions of the garnishment statutes. [Hereinafter cited as Em-
ployer Survey].
"Telephone interviews were conducted from a prepared questionnaire with rep-
resentatives of twenty-five unions selected from the Seattle Telephone Directory. The
questionnaire consisted of eighteen questions divided into three areas: 1) the ex-
tent to which union membership was concerned about garnishment; 2) union re-
sponses to garnishment and the credit problems of its membership; and 3) union
attitudes toward possible revisions of the garnishment statutes. [Hereinafter cited as
Union Survey].
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and with possible judicial restrictions on abuses in the system serve
to highlight further the manifold problems presented by the existing
wage garnishment process. Finally, specific recommendations for
legislative reform are proposed.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAN:EwoizK
Washington's garnishment provisions are typical of those in other
states where garnishment statutes have not undergone substantial
revision in recent years.22 A wage garnishment writ may issue for
one of two principal- reasons: (a) in execution of a judgment; or
(b) where the plaintiff sues for a debt which he alleges to be just,
due and unpaid, and makes an affidavit that the writ applied for is not
sued out to injure either the principal defendant or the garnishee-
employer.2 3 Garnishment prior to judgment ((b), above) is usually
commenced by filing the writ of garnishment and the complaint
simultaneously. In wage garnishment cases the writ of garnishment
is usually served upon an employer prior to service of the complaint
upon the principal defendant.24 While the statutes do require a
plaintiff-creditor to execute a garnishment bond insuring the veracity
of the allegations necessary for issuance of a prejudgment garnish-
ment writ, this requirement applies, in most cases, only when the
amount claimed in the main action exceeds three hundred dollars.
25
The Washington garnishment provisions were amended in the last legislative ses-
sion (ch. 142, 143, [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws 903, 919) but, insofar as the amendments
are relevant to wage garnishment, their principal impact will be to reduce the number
of defaults by employers, by requiring more explicit wording of the answer form and
the serving of addressed envelopes with the writ. See notes 75-77 infra and accompa-
nying text. Before that, the wage exemption was raised in 1963. Ch. 13, § 1, [1963]
Wash. Sess. Laws 288.
In superior court a writ of garnishment may also issue pursuant to a writ of
attachment. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.32.010 (1956) (grounds for issuance of a writ in
superior courts). -The justice court section omits a suit pursuant to a writ of attach-
ment. WASH. REV. CODE § 12.32.010 (Supp. 1967).
Garnishment proceedings in the justice court and superior courts are governed by
separate statutory provisions. Justice court proceedings are a part of Title 12 (jus-
tice Courts-Civil Procedure) under Chapter 12.32.-(garnishment). Superior court
proceedings are a part of Title 7 (Special Proceedings) under Chapter 7.32.-(gar-
nishment). However, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.32.060-.090, dealing with state and public
corporations, are apparently applicable to both justice and superior courts. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.32.310 (Supp. 1967).
Generally, the garnishment provisions governing the two courts are the same; any
relevant differences will be noted. This project is concerned primarily with prac-
tices in justice court, where the majority of collection actions are filed. Justice
court jurisdiction is limited to claims under $1,000 exclusive of interest, cost and
attorney's fees, and excludes controversies which bring into issue the title to prop-
erty. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 3.66.020-.030 (1956).
' See note 97 infra.
'WASH. REv. CODE §7.32.020 (1956), requires plaintiff to execute a bond for all
prejudgment garnishments in superior court. Bond is required in justice court only
if the plaintiff's claim exceeds $300. WASH. REv. CODE § 12.32.015 (Supp. 1967).
1968 ]
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A writ of garnishment must be served with four prepared statutory
answer forms and three addressed, stamped envelopes;2 6 it may be
served either by a sheriff or by any citizen of the state over twenty-one
years of age not a party to the action. 7  The garnishee defendant
must answer before the return date noted on the writ.28 When the
wage garnishment writ is served on the employer-garnishee it catches
all the defendant-debtor's wages then due; it is not effective against
future wages.2 9 Washington exempts from garnishment between
twenty-five and fifty dollars per week of a defendant's wages, de-
pending on the number of his dependents.3 0 However, these exemp-
tions are not automatically granted by the employer; they must be
claimed by the principal defendant at the courthouse before a court
clerk.
31
While the Washington statute is similar to those in other states,
data compiled for this note indicate that in actual operation this
statute contains defects which lead to substantial injustice. An ex-
ample is the lack of automatic exemptions for debtor-employees which
is, to a large degree, responsible for the fact that only 7 percent of
all employees whose wages are garnished claim their statutory exemp-
tions.2 While this and other examples will be discussed later, it
should be noted at this juncture that such defects are inherent in a
statutory framework which fails to take account of operational reality
and cannot be countered by simply tinkering with the statute as was
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.32.120, 12.32.060 (Supp. 1967). The three envelopes must
be addressed to: the clerk of the court issuing the writ; plaintiff or his attorney;
and the defendant.
-' Id.
'WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.32.170, 12.32.120 (1956).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 7.32.180 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 12.32.130 (1956).
See Frieze v. Powell, 79 Wash. 483, 140 P. 690 (1914).
'WASH. REV. CODE § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967):
Exemption of wages, salary or other compensation
Thirty-five dollars out of each week's wages, salary or other compensation
regularly paid for personal services rendered by any person having one or more
individuals dependent upon him or her for support, and in addition thereto five
dollars per week for each dependent shall be exempt from garnishment, whether
such wages, salary or other such compensation are paid, or to be paid, weekly,
monthly, or at other regular intervals, and whether there be due the defendant
wages, salary or other such compensation for one week or for a longer period:
Provided, That the total amount exempted shall not exceed the sum of fifty dollars
per week.
Twenty-five dollars out of each week's wages, salary or other compensation of
any person without dependents shall be exempt from garnishment....
This act shall apply to garnishments in both the superior courts and justice
courts in the state of Washington.
"Id. The statute by its terms does not state whether the exemption is automatic,
but it has been interpreted to require that defendant claim his exemption.12 Appendix, Table 6.
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done in Washington in the 1967 legislative session. Substantial
statutory reform is urgently needed-reform that will reflect com-
mercial reality and protect all parties in the system to the extent such
protection is justified.
II. THE USE OF WAGE GARNISHMENT BY CREDITORS
34
Wage garnishment is the principal legal remedy in the creditor's
arsenal of collection devices." Creditors generally contend that its
chief importance is as a "club"; that the threat of wage garnishment
collects more money than the amount collected through actual use of
the remedy in the courts.36 In fact, collection agencies make most
of their collections without recourse to any legal action at all. Seattle
collectors interviewed report that they successfully collect about one-
half of all accounts turned over to them,37 and that over 80 percent
' See note 22 supra.
"The word "creditor" is used in this note to refer to a group of which approx-
imately 25% are original creditors (mainly individuals and finance companies), and
75% are collection agencies.
Of the cases in the justice court survey, 78% were brought by plaintiffs on assign-
ments. In data provided by Mrs. Helen Griggs, Chief Civil Clerk, Seattle District
Justice Court, there is a breakdown of the 483 cases filed during the week ending
April 19, 1967; 74.9% of these were brought by collectors. It is claimed that 98% of
the garnishment actions in the District Court of Multnomah County, Oregon, were
brought by collectors. Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregon?, 40 REF.
J. 78, 79 (1966).
' Collector Survey. Of collectors interviewed, 73% stated that they use garnish-
ments more than any other type of legal action.
'Proceedings 39 (testimony of Mr. Joseph Weissman, California Association of
Collectors) :
The advantage of the remedy in California isn't the actual physical attachment.
No creditor or collection agency makes money by virtue of an attachment It is
the fact that the availability of the remedy is there, that each creditor can attach,
that requires a debtor who does owe the obligation to seek some arrangement to
satisfy.
See, e.g., Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Reconnendations,
53 CALiF. L. REv. 1214, 1229 (1965); Conard, An Appraisal of Illinois Law on the
Enforcement of Judgments, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 96, 100.
The justice court survey reveals that Seattle creditors also do not utilize the actual
garnishment to collect money. Employer-garnishees answered in 34.2% of the wage
garnishment cases that money was owed the principal defendant (most of the remain-
ing 65.8% of employers were discharged before they had a chance to answer). The
average amount of the answer was $151.26. However, this money was ordered paid to
the plaintiff in only 16.6% of the total cases, and the average amount ordered paid was
$82.06. Creditors were able to recover in default against the employer-garnishee in an
additional 4.2% of the cases. See Appendix, Table 5. A similar survey in San Fran-
cisco shows that even garnishments in execution of judgments successfully recover only
Y4 of the principal indebtedness sought. Brunn, supra at 1239.
' Collector Survey. Collectors were asked what percentage of the value of debts
turned over to them were actually collected; of those sampled 23.1% answered
21-40%, and 53.8% answered 41-60%. Figures from the Associated Credit Bureaus
of America show that recovery rates of collection agencies vary by state from 12%
to 53%. Washington's rate is listed as 34.4% Proceedings, App. B.
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of these collections are made without filing legal action. 38 A California
collector reports that his office takes in 12,500 new accounts per
month and finds legal action necessary in only 250 to 300 of these. 9
Since wage garnishment is a particularly "visible" weapon for collec-
tion, creditors attribute their high collection rate to the effectiveness
of the threat of its use.4 °
However, the importance of wage garnishment as a "club" may be
exaggerated. The Seattle employers interviewed think their employees
are only moderately concerned about wage garnishment. 4' The labor
unions contacted likewise report only moderate interest in wage
garnishment among their membership. 2 Indeed, nearly all people
pay their debts voluntarily to maintain their credit standing in the
community, and would continue to do so with or without existence of
the statutory collection remedies of wage garnishment.
43
The small minority of consumers with which collection agencies
deal, however, may be acutely aware of the possibility of wage gar-
nishment. The sharp awareness of garnishment among minority
groups,44 people filing bankruptcy,45 and people who quit their jobs
in fear of garnishment46 lends credence to creditors' claims that the
fear of garnishment collects more than the remedy itself.
"Collector Survey. Collectors were asked how many of their accounts collected
were collected without recourse to legal action; of those sampled 59.3% answered
over 80%; 14.7% answered 71% to 80%; and 11% did not answer.
'Proceedings 40-41 (testimony of Hugh McCarty, California Association of
Collectors).
"See note 35 supra.
" Employer Survey. Of those interviewed, 51.5% said their employees were not
at all concerned about wage garnishment; 25.7% said they were at least somewhat
concerned; while 22.8% didn't know.
"2 Union Survey. Union representatives were asked how they would describe
their union's concern in seeking protection for its members from garnishment. The
answers of those sampled were: adamant 4%; strong 36%; weak 32%; and none
28%0.
The representatives were also asked whether garnishment was a problem among
their membership: 36% answered "yes," and 64% answered "no."
'The delinquency rate on installment credit has been estimated at between 1%
and 2%. Proceedings, App. A (letter from Robert Kopriva, Associated Credit
Bureaus of California).
"See note 87 infra.
" Studies show a sharp awareness of garnishment among bankrupts. In a study
of 84 bankrupts in Michigan, 75% said that garnishment or the threat of garnish-
ment was the reason they filed bankruptcy. Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and
Personal Factors Leading to Bankruptcy, 18 Bureau of Business and Economic Re-
search, Michigan State University Graduate School of Business Administration,
Occasional Paper no. 15 (1965). In another study in Illinois, 35 of 73 bankrupts said
the threat of garnishment or the fear of job loss caused them to file bankruptcy.
STABLER, THE EXPERIENCE OF BAN'KRUPTCY 7(1966). These sources and others are
cited by Professor Vern Countryman in testimony before a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings 726. See also note 132 infra.
"Employer Survey. Employers were asked how many of their employees quit rather
[ VOL. 43 : 743
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Of course, creditors bring other pressures to bear in addition to
the threat of garnishment. All the collectors interviewed said they
send collection letters to all of their accounts, and while over 80
percent of these letters make some mention of legal action only 20
percent mention wage garnishment specifically. Collectors in the
Seattle sample frequently use the telephone in attempts to contact
debtors, but only a few visit debtor's homes.47
If other methods of persuasion fail, creditors will resort to legal
action; this usually involves a garnishment," and generally a garnish-
ment prior to judgment.49 Prejudgment garnishment was originally
designed as an extraordinary remedy to be used primarily for the
purpose of preventing a debtor from leaving the jurisdiction."' Wash-
ington, however, requires only an affidavit that the debt is "just, due
and unpaid" and that the writ "is not sued out to injure either the
defendant or the garnishee."51 In the collector survey, those creditors
who used prejudgment garnishment cited a belief that the debtor
was about to leave town as the most common reason for using the
remedy, but a large number also mentioned negative responses to
collection letters and other contacts as important factors.52 It is un-
than have their wages garnished; of the employers interviewed 38.1% answered
"none"; 41.2% answered "few"; 5.9% answered "some"; 8.7% answered "many"
and 5.9% did not know. It is significant that even a few employees feel threatened
enough by the possibility of garnishment to leave their job to avoid it.
" Collector Survey. Examples of dun letters mentioning the possibility of wage
garnishment may be found in Hearings at 1025-26. One of the letters contained the
following postscript:
(ATTENTION: In addition to the above, it has been our experience that
when we attach a debtor's wages, his employer is inclined to discharge said
employee since attachment causes the employer additional expense in keeping
special records for the sheriff's or marshal's office regarding your wages. It is
not our desire to cause undue hardship, so please be guided accordingly.)
COOPERATION COSTS LESS THAN LEGAL ACTION! YOU ALONE
CONTROL YOUR NEXT MOVE!
"s In the Collector Survey, 73.1% of the collection agencies indicated that they use
wage garnishment more often than other types of legal action. This is reflected in
the case filings in the Seattle District Justice Court. Of 36,046 cases filed, 15,624
were garnishments. See note 7 supra. However, each garnishment must be accom-
panied by or preceded by a main action on the debt, which must be filed separately.
These main actions are included in the 36,046 total. Therefore, it is reasonable to
estimate that 85% of these cases will eventually involve a garnishment.
"See Appendix, Table 2.
Cf. 52 IowA L. Rlv. 543, 547-48 (1966).
IWAsH. REv. CODE § 7.32.010 (1956); WAsHi. REv. CODE § 12.32.010 (Supp. 1967).
r' Collector Survey. Collectors were asked what factors influenced the decision to
use prejudgment garnishment. They were given the following choice of answers:
(a) Type of debt (list "type) ; (b) Number of other debts of debtor; (c) Credit rat-
ing of debtor; (d) Belief that debtor was about to leave town; (e) Negative or no
response to dun letters and other contacts; (f) Other. The responses of those sampled
19681
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likely that the 57.2 percent of the debtors whose wages were garnished
prior to judgment during the period surveyed5 3 were, in reality, "about
to leave town." Instead, creditors probably initiate the majority of
their justice court suits by a prejudgment garnishment because this
form of action, combined with the low wage exemptions allowed, often
applies sufficient pressure to bring the debtor into the creditor's office
to arrange a method of paying the debt.54
Unfortunately, once a debt is in the hands of a collection agency
a debtor very seldom escapes by paying the original debt alone.
Additional charges, including attorney fees, collection charges, interest
and service fees, may be added to the original obligation and de-
manded from the debtor when he comes to the creditor's office."
Collectors, when interviewed, were reluctant to discuss these charges,
and usually confined themselves to the statement that they charged
"all lawful costs," or refused to answer at all,"6 but some indication
of the charges added can be gained from a perusal of the complaints
filed by collectors in justice court. Many of these complaints asked
fees in amounts greater than eventually allowed by the court.5 7 Affi-
davits are on file at the Washington State Attorney General's office
containing allegations that creditors have demanded fees more than
double the original obligation.58
were: (a) 9%; (b) 0%; (c) 9%; (d) 30.3%; (e) 24.2%; (f) 9%; and 18.5% did
not answer. Discussions with some creditors, however, cast doubt upon the reason-
ableness of concluding that a primary factor in the decision to use prejudgment
garnishment is a genuine belief that a debtor is about to leave town. See text
accompanying note 64 infra.
'Of the garnishment actions in the justice court survey, 57.2% were prejudgment
garnishments. In addition, several of the executions were on judgments resulting
from actions originally initiated by a prejudgment garnishment. See Appendix,
Table 2.
' Judge Lewis, Seattle District Justice Court, contends that creditors are using
the court system merely to get the debtor into their office where they get him to sign
a note for the amount claimed, including exorbitant costs. Interview with Judges
Hoar, Lewis, and Starr, Seattle District Justice Court, Aug. 18, 1967.
Id.
Collector Survey. Of those interviewed, 46% said they included "all lawful
costs" in these renegotiated contracts, while 23% did not answer at all.
'Justice court judges will exercise their discretion to cut down "unreasonable"
attorney's fees and interest charges. Interview, supra note 54. A few instances were
noted in compiling the justice court survey. Anything labelled a "collection charge"
was usually not allowed, and attorney's fees were occasionally reduced. For a detailed
discussion of fees allowed by the courts, see text accompanying notes 167 through
178 infra.
' Affidavits on file at the Washington State Attorney General's Office, Consumer
Protection Division, Seattle. The authors have agreed not to print the details of
these affidavits.
An example of the fees demanded by a creditor before settlement is found in
Hearings at 1025, where the creditor added $58 in fees to a $16 debt.
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The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and
who is usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands
for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor will be under
considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection charges in order
to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will often sign a new
contract of "payment schedule" which incorporates these additional
charges. 9 After the debtor signs such a contract, the creditor will
usually release his wages, perhaps retaining the initial payment on
the renewed obligation. The main action on the debt, however, will
be continued to judgment,0 usually a judgment on default of the
defendant-debtor. 6' Even though the costs allowed by the court may
be lower than those incorporated in the new obligation, creditors evi-
dently believe that having an enforceable judgment on the original
debt gives them some security against the debtor's defaulting on the
renewed obligation.
Creditors differ in their attitudes toward prejudgment garnishment.
Of the collectors interviewed, one-third reported using the remedy
at least sometimes, while over half claimed they seldom used it.
Some creditors apparently use a prejudgment garnishment in every
legal action possible, while others use it only a few times a year.62
Most would not favor abolishing prejudgment garnishment63 but one
member of a vocal minority made the following remarks:
Abolition of prejudgment garnishment would eliminate ninety-five per-
cent of the abuse in the present system. Fly-by-nights and unscrupulous
collection agencies use it to exact exorbitant collection charges.... The
argument that prejudgment garnishment is necessary to catch someone
about to leave town is a lot of bunk. I know of only one such case in
forty-five years experience.64
Commentators and judges have echoed this view, characterizing
' Collector Survey. The collectors interviewed were asked how often they nego-
tiated a new contract or payment schedule with debtors who come to their office;
40% answered "very often"; 24% said "sometimes"; and 20% answered "seldom";
while 16% did not reply. Many of those who answered "seldom" indicated that they
usually handle small debts which they can collect in one wage garnishment. On such
small debts, the agency simply demands complete payment.
'0 Collector Survey. Collectors were asked, "If the debtor comes to your office and
makes satisfactory arrangements, do you let the main action run to judgment?";
of those sampled 36% said "very often"; 16% "sometimes"; 16% "seldom"; and 32%
refused to answer.
"See Appendix, Table 3.
'Collector Survey.
'Collector Survey. Of the collectors interviewed 22.2% favored abolishing pre-
judgment garnishment with 59.3% opposed, and 18.5% expressing no opinion.
' Collector Survey. Interview with Mr. Glen B. Faulk.
1968]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
garnishment prior to judgment as a form of "blackmail" which should
be abolished.6"
Most of the collectors interviewed, however, appeared reasonably
satisfied with the present state of Washington's garnishment laws.
This is not surprising since wage garnishment provides creditors with
a quick and relatively inexpensive method of enforcing collections.
Legislative revision of garnishment should balance the service the law
presently provides for creditors against the burdens it imposes on
other segments of our society.
III. THE EFFECT OF WAGE GARNISHMENT ON EMPLOYERS
The employer is the often ignored man in the middle of the wage
garnishment process. Yet, employer discharge of garnished employees,
or fear of this discharge, may be the primary factor in making
garnishment an effective creditors' tool.6 6 It is also the primary
cause of the burdensome social costs associated with the remedy.
In 1865 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave the following reason
why the Pennsylvania State Legislature abolished wage garnishment:
[Q]uite likely they [the legislature] had in view ... the ... inconven-
ience ... of manufacturers and other large employers being harassed
with attachment execution ... complicating accounts, accumulating costs,
and, depriving them of the laborers on whom they depended, by divert-
' See Note, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 327-28
(1956) [hereinafter cited as 45 Ky. L.J. (1956)] (quoting Robert Caldwell, a Ken-
tucky attorney) :
The result in many cases is vicious, allowing "loan sharks and collection agen-
cies practically to blackmail a debtor by tying up his wages in advance of
proving the validity of their claim, and without prior notice of intent to attach."
See also Brunn, supra note 36, at 1248. The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code
prohibits garnishment prior to judgment. UNIFORM CONISUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.104
(Tent. Draft No. 2, Working Draft No. 4, 1967).
Judge Patterson, Everett District Justice Court, opposes garnishment prior to
judgment (see Foreword supra), and all three judges interviewed at the Seattle Dis-
trict Justice Court favor some restrictions of the remedy. Interview with Judges
Hoar, Lewis and Starr, supra, note 54.
But see Note, Garnishment in Florida: Analysis, Assessment, and Proposals,
19 U. FLA. REV. 99, 102 (1966) : "The need for such a procedure prior to judgment
is obvious...." See also 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 768-69, 772-73, where the recommen-
dation to retain prejudgment garnishment is reached, primarily on the basis that the
presence or the absence of the remedy makes no difference because most cases will, in
either event, result in a default judgment against the debtor for a failure to appear.
'See, e.g., Conrad, An Appraisal of Illinois Law on the Enforcement of Judgments,
1951 U. ILL. L.F. 96, 100:
In fact, the wage garnishment is practically useless as a means of catching
accrued wages in any substantial amount. Its usefulness is based on the fact that
most employers dislike to be garnisheed, and will threaten to fire an employee
whose creditors garnishee them. To avoid being fired, the debtor may agree to
pay a reasonable proportion of his wages each week to the creditor.
[ VoL. 43 : 743
WAGE GARNISHMENT
ing wages from the current support of the laborer's family to the paying
of former debts.6 7
Since 1865, the Pennsylvania court, as well as courts and legislatures
in other states, have largely overlooked the burden which wage gar-
nishment places upon the employer." The United States Supreme
Court, in response to a contention that garnishment violated the
employer's right to due process stated: "The suggestion that a sub-
tantial constitutional right of the garnishee is impaired because
he may be put to some additional expense of bookkeeping in keeping
his account with the judgment debtor, is plainly without merit."69
"Some additional expense" can be quite substantial, particularly
in large firms. Notices or writs of garnishment are usually served by
knowledgeable creditors on the day before payday, and may be "de-
livered to big firms in bundles."70 The Boeing Company, Washington
State's largest employer, is now served with over 500 writs of garnish-
ment per month.7' Boeing's Commercial Airplane Division presently
employs five clerks and a supervisor to check payroll records and
answer these writs. Although Boeing ordinarily processes its payroll
by computer, the accounts of employees whose wages are garnished
must be calculated by hand72 because the writ frequently catches
only a portion of the wages which will be paid during a pay period.
As a result, one check must be "split."7 Also, atforneys retained
by the company spend considerable time with wage garnishments. In
addition to such expenses, many companies also lose the time their
employees spend consulting the garnishment clerk or personnel de-
partment, and going downtown to the courthouse or the creditor's
or collector's office. Furthermore, if a company does fire an employee,
additional costs are incurred in hiring and training a replacement.
The Boeing Company spends approximately $200,000 per year as a
"Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa. 387 (1865).
c See Comment, Garnishinent of Wages in Pennsylvania: Its History and Ration-
ale, 70 DicK. L. REv. 199, 200 (1966).
'Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290(1924).
' Hearings 1017.
"
'Minutes, Washington State Legislative Council, judiciary Committee 3 (Nov.
10-11, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Minutes] (testimony of Mr. Nyle G. Barnes).
"Interview with officials of the Boeing Company, Aug. 3, 1967.
SFor example, The Boeing Company pays its employees every two weeks on
Friday. Each paycheck represents wages earned during the two weeks ending the
previous Saturday. Thus, a writ of garnishment served on a Thursday will catch
not only the entire pay check due on the next day, Friday, but also up to four days
wages from the check following that. Therefore, the latter check must be "split."
In addition, if the employee claims an exemption, the company must issue him a
check for the exempt amount.
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direct result of garnishments against Boeing employees."4
In addition to monetary outlay, employer-garnishee defendants are
also exposed to possible liability in default for failure to answer the
writ on time.7 5 Large firms with efficient clerical staffs and readily
available legal advice are rarely held liable in default; however, the
owners of small firms with few employees may not be familiar with
writs of garnishment or may not answer the writ for other reasons,
with the result that judgments for the entire claim may be entered
against them. 6  Recent amendments to Washington's garnishment
laws, requiring that answer forms with detailed instructions and
stamped, addressed envelopes be included with the writ, should allevi-
ate the problem of defaults against small employers.
To reduce the expense and nuisance of wage garnishments, and the
possibility of default liability, most employers have adopted policies
of discharging their employees after one or more garnishments.78
SMinutes 30. Of this amount $120,000 represents direct expenses for clerical
costs, salaries for supervisors, etc., and the balance represents indirect expenses such
as the value of time lost by employees.
The Cook County Credit Bureau in Chicago surveyed 1,100 employers in 1964 and
found that processing a single garnishment costs a company from $15 to $35. The
estimated cost of garnishment to the surveyed employers totaled $12 million annually.
Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1966, at 18, col. 2.
In Washington an insignificant amount of these costs is recovered through legal
fees paid to the garnishee defendant by virtue of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.32.290,
12.32.210 (1956). The Boeing Company's figures for the first three months of 1967
average about $750 per month, which would total $9,000 per year in legal fees paid
to Boeing either by the plaintiff or by the principal defendant.
Expense to the employer, however, must be viewed in perspective. The $200,000
per year Boeing spends on wage garnishments is insignificant when compared to
the company's annual operating expenses.
' WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.32.170, 12.32.120 (1956).
"The survey of justice court files showed a default judgment against the gar-
nishee defendant entered in 8 out of 187, or 4.3% of the cases. These judgments were
entered against three restaurants, two import houses, one tavern, one pharmacy, and
one paint company.
Ch. 142, 143 [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws 903, 919. See note 22 supra.
Another factor reducing the risk of default, and perhaps the monetary expense
incurred by the garnishee defendant, is the high percentage of discharges given the
garnishee defendant. In 78.4% of the cases in the Seattle sample the garnishee de-
fendant was discharged. Appendix, Table 5. These discharges often occurred within
two or three days after the writ was served, thereby eliminating the costs of any
clerical work not yet completed by the employer.
' Seattle employers were asked if they discharged their employees for garnish-
ment primarily because: 1) bookkeeping and other related expenses render garnish-
ment an unjustifiable nuisance, or 2) frequent garnishments are such evidence of an
employee's bad character and poor credit management as to make him a poor employ-
ment risk. By their replies, 53.1% of those interviewed indicated that expenses re-
lated to garnishment were their primary reason for discharging employees while
46.9% cited garnishment as evidence of poor character. See also Felsenfeld, Some
Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. &
Coeim. L. REv. 535, 565 (1967).
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While these policies vary widely in form and application, surveys in
Seattle and San Diego,7 9 plus less systematic reports from other
areas, 0 show conclusively that the majority of employers will dis-
charge their employees for garnishment. This majority approaches
unanimity among large manufacturing firms whose employees are often
semi-skilled or unskilled and are more frequently garnished."-
A number of firms have flexible policies of discharge for garnish-
ment. This flexibility, more desirable on its face than a flat "one
garnishment and you're out" rule, lends itself to coercion and dis-
crimination. An example is the Boeing Company's rule that an
employee is subject to "discharge, or lesser disciplinary action" if
his wages are garnished twice within a twelve month period." The
choice of action to be taken is left to the discretion of his supervisor,
whose decision may be influenced by extraneous matters such as
personal likes, dislikes or moral outlook. 3 Other firms state that
'The Seattle employer survey revealed that 45% of employers sampled had a
definite policy regarding discharge for garnishment while 55% did not. Of those
answering, 19% said they "always" discharged an employee for wage garnishment;
54% said they "sometimes" discharged garnished employees (many of these had policies
of discharging after two or three garnishments, but others had no definite policy);
however, only 27% of the employers interviewed stated that they "never" fired an
employee because his wages were garnished. Employer Survey. A similar survey
conducted in San Diego reveals that only one out of 72 firms discharged an employee
after the first garnishment (the rest, however, warned the employee) ; 17% fired the
employee after the second garnishment; 49% after the third garnishment; while 18%
did not take disciplinary action for garnishments. Hearings 1020-21.
' A study examining garnishment cases in the Wisconsin cities of Green Bay,
Kenosha, Racine, and Madison revealed that 11% of the garnished employees were
fired forthwith, 41% were warned of dismissal, and in 15% the employer tried to
help the employee. 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 766 n.29. There was no indication in
cases involving warning or discharge whether the employee had been garnished
previously.
Other examples of employer policies with respect to discharge are contained in:
Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1966, at 18, col. 2; Proceedings 19, 63-65; Hearings
on S. 750 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Conmn. on Banking and Currency,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 287 (1963) ; 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 330 n.58 (1956).
S'The Seattle employer survey reveals that only 8.3% of the firms with over 250
employees never discharge an employee for garnishment, while 34.8% of those firms
with under 50 employees never discharge an employee for garnishment. The per-
centage of firms which fire an employee after the first garnishment is about even for
both groups- 2 5 .0% for the large firms and 26.1% for the small firms. For a descrip-
tion of the employer survey, see note 20, supra.
' This rule is contained in a little booklet entitled "Plant Rules" which is dis-
tributed to new employees. Copies of these rules are also posted on bulletin boards
throughout the plant.
' As an example of the extreme variations possible under this rule there is, at
least according to information given us in numerous personal interviews, a certain
anonymous employee at Boeing who has managed to survive fourteen to eighteen
garnishments (depending on who was telling the story) without being fired. If this
individual really does exist, he would no doubt be amused to know that he is a living
legend throughout the Seattle credit industry.
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they will not fire a "valued" employee. 4 When management exercises
this type of discretion it will be more likely to discharge an employee
who can be inexpensively replaced. Thus the unskilled wage earner
is likely to be fired after fewer garnishments than his skilled or
salaried counterpart.8 5 This is unfortunate because the unskilled
worker is more likely to be living from hand to mouth, heavily depen-
dent upon each week's paycheck; 6 he is more likely to be further
in debt; and he is also more apt to be a member of a minority group
already somewhat disenchanted with our legal system." In addition,
a discretionary policy of discharge for garnishment may enable man-
agement to institute layoffs without conforming to seniority require-
ments or other provisions of its union contract.8 8
Another flexible policy in addition to considering an employee's
"value" is a policy of not discharging a man believed to be making
a good faith effort to arrange a satisfactory settlement with his cred-
itor. 9 An employer may adopt this approach if his primary concern
is to avoid successive garnishments by the same creditor. In some
cases, however, this has a coercive effect on the employee by dis-
"The "value" of an employee as a factor in the decision whether or not to dis-
charge was mentioned occasionally during the Employer Survey, usually by owners
or managers of light manufacturing industries employing highly skilled workers
who are difficult to replace. Other elements apparently included in the judgment of
an employee's "value" are the length of time an employee has been with the company,
and his past work performance.
'Also, marginal employees are much more likely to be garnished in the first
place because of credit problems arising from prior unemployment. Murphy, Pro-
posed Consumer Credit Legislation, 48 CHI. B. REc. 157, 166 (1967).
'The Department of Labor estimates that the average family spends currently
between 85% and 90% of its income for necessities. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
REP. No. 237-93, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES AND INcOME 1 (1965). The percentage is
no doubt even higher for families in which the wage earner is an unskilled laborer.
' Florence M. Rice, Director of the Harlem Consumer Education Council, char-
acterized garnishment as "an evil racket in our community which serves to keep
poor people locked in poverty. Among the low-paid poorly educated a credit sale is
often made with no other thought but to garnishee the customer's salary." Hearings
on H.R. 7179 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comin. on Government Operations,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 180 (1966). Statements of the role garnishment plays in
schemes to defraud Puerto Ricans who speak little English are contained id at 175
(testimony of Mrs. Aponte), and in LEGAL SERVICES DIvIsIoN OF THE OFFICE OF
Eco.NOMIC OPPORTUNITY, THE POOR SEEK JUSTICE 16 (1967).
' The discharge of a union member for wage garnishment is not a per se dis-
criminatory discharge prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3),
49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952). See Note, State
TT/age Exemption Laws and the New Iowa Statute-A Comparative Analysis, 43
IowA L. REV. 555, 567 n.75 (1958), and cases cited therein; see also note 105 infra.
' A standard of this nature was mentioned a few times during interviews with
employers. Such a policy could encompass anything, from requiring a penitent atti-
tude of the employee to a mere attempt to make sure that he will not ignore a large
debt completely.
[ VOL. 43 : 743
WAGE GARNISHMENT
couraging his recourse to the courts and forcing him into an unequal
bargaining position with his creditor.90
Several of the employers interviewed take more constructive action
-which may reduce the number of garnishments served on their em-
ployees. This usually takes the form of credit counselling." However,
only 7.9 percent of the employers in Seattle provide credit counselling
on a regular basis; an additional 34.3 percent give credit counselling
on an informal basis whenever desired.9' Once an employee is gar-
nished, his employer usually prefers to remain neutral. Only 32.1
percent of the Seattle firms inform their employees of the availability
of wage exemptions, and only 20.6 percent counsel a garnished em-
ployee as to the legal steps he might take.93 Thus, most employers
deal with the credit problems of their employees only in a negative
manner by firing those whose wages are too frequently garnished.
Evidently, the majority of the employers interviewed do not believe
that the costs or inconvenience of wage garnishment are so great that
they would advocate its abolition. 4 Rather, they would accept some
garnishment expensQ as a cost of doing business, while trying to mini-
mize that expense by discharging employees who are, in their opinion,
garnished too frequently. However, in seeking to avoid the costs of
garnishment in this manner, employers may be shifting disproportion-
ate burdens to other segments of society-burdens reflected in in-
creased costs of welfare payments, unemployment compensation, and
maintenance of municipal and bankruptcy courts.
IV. THE EFFECT OF WAGE GARNISHZENT ON THE DEBTOR
The average person subjected to a wage garnishment is not pro-
tected by the legal provisions designed to protect him. His wages
W Sometimes a firm will go so far as to send the employee to see the collection
agency, or else call the agency and negotiate an agreement on behalf of their employee.
Proceedings 88.
"One owner of a small firm said that he will make personal loans to his employ-
ees. (Employer Survey). Employees of many of the larger firms also have access to
credit unions, provided either by the employer or by the union.
Boeing's Personnel Relations Department estimates that 80% of their dealings
with employees concern debt problems. Interview with Pat Greiner, Personnel Rela-
tions Dept., the Boeing Co., July 14, 1967.
" Employer Survey. An additional 31.4% of those sampled provide informal
credit counselling on an occasional basis. Of the employers interviewed, 2.9% always
guide their employees toward outside credit counselling; 29.4% do so occasionally.
0Id.
"Id. Seattle employers were asked whether they favored abolishing wage gar-
nishment; of those surveyed 12.8% answered "yes," 84.6% answered "no," and 2.6%
ventured no opinion.
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are garnished before he is served with notice of suit; he does not
claim a wage exemption; and the subsequent judgment against him
is most often by default. He usually responds to the claim without
seeking the advice of an attorney and without setting foot inside a
courthouse. To a large degree, debtors' problems with wage garnish-
ment can be traced to prejudgment garnishment, employer policies
of discharge for garnishment, the low wage exemption, lack of infor-
mation, and a general alienation from our legal system.
The procedure usually followed in prejudgment garnishments in
King County is to file the complaint and the writ of garnishment
simultaneously.95 In a justice court proceeding, the plaintiff then has
fifteen days to serve the writ on the employer and to serve the notice
of suit and complaint on the debtor.96 The writ of garnishment is
almost always served upon the employer at least one day before the
debtor is served with the complaint. In many cases the complaint is
served several days after the writ.9 7 There are several reasons for
this: first, the plaintiff with little expense can readily discover if
the debtor has recently quit his job by preliminarily serving the
employer; 98 second, the employer, with regular working hours and a
definite place of business, is considerably easier to serve than a debtor,
who usually must be served in the evening and who may frequently
change residences; finally, many collectors deliberately try to surprise
the debtor with a wage garnishment for fear that he will quit his job
and leave town if he hears of a legal proceeding against him.99
Because the writs are frequently served upon the employer on the
afternoon before payday, a large employer may not have time to
' This is evidenced by the dockets of the Seattle District Justice Court, where
the main action and garnishment action are usually recorded on consecutive pages
with identical filing dates.
'This is assuming the return date is set at the twenty day maximum allowed by
the court rules. See WASY. Civ. R.J. CT. 4(b), (e).
"A study of 44 cases of prejudgment garnishment in which both the writ of
garnishment and the notice of suit were served reveals that in 37 of these cases the
writ of garnishment was served on the employer garnishee at least one day before
the notice of suit was served on the principal defendant. The median difference
between the two dates of service was 5 days. This was also the mode. Taking an
arithmetic average, the notice of suit was served on the debtor 5.8 days after the
writ of garnishment was served on his employer. In the majority of cases the fact
of garnishment was thus the first notice to the principal debtor that legal action was
being taken against him. Justice Court Survey.
"Another advantage in serving the employer first is that the debtor, upon being
notified that his wages have been garnished, may go immediately to the creditor's
office, where the creditor will serve him with the complaint or at least obtain the
debtor's current address. The authors have been unable to determine to what extent
this actually occurs.
' See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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notify an employee that his wages have been garnished prior to the
time he is to pick up his check. Thus, an employee may first learn
of the legal proceedings against him when he opens his pay envelope
and finds a notice that his wages have been garnished. 100
In Washington a garnished employee may claim a wage exemption
of up to fifty dollars per week.' 1 These exemptions, however, are
not automatically granted; in justice court cases the debtor on his
own initiative must claim his exemption at the office of the court
clerk.102 As a result, exemptions were claimed in only seven percent
of the cases in the justice court sample.10 3
One of the several reasons for the low number of wage exemptions
claimed appears to be that most debtors are unaware of the existence
of statutory exemptions.' As a rule, in justice court cases the debtor
does not retain counsel who would inform him of his right to an
exemption. The labor unions contacted do not generally disseminate
information on the exemption law.' 5 Furthermore, most employers
'"' Interview with officials of the Boeing Company, supra note 72.
01 WAsH. REv. CODE §7.32.280 (Supp. 1967), quoted supra note 30.
-See note 31 supra.
" Appendix, Table 6. The same phenomena have been noted in other states with-
out automatic exemptions. See Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's New Exemption Law,
55 Ky. L.J. 618, 624-25 (1967) ; 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 765; Hearings 1036.
... Interview with officials of the Boeing Company, supra note 72.
'C Union Survey. Only 12% of the union representatives interviewed make infor-
mation available to their members on what to do if their wages are garnished. The
WASHINGTON STATE LABOR COUNCIL REPORTS, Dec. 20, 1967, contain a reproduction
of a sheet distributed by the Seattle Legal Services Center entitled "How to Protect
Yourself from Wage Garnishments," which contains information about the wage
exemption. It is not known how widely this was distributed.
Most labor unions do not take direct steps to alleviate the problems caused by
wage garnishment. Although 36% of the union representatives interviewed reported
that garnishment is a problem for their membership, only 12% said their unions
distrubute any information to their members explaining what steps an employee can
take if his wages are garnished. Only 16% of the unions contacted have any program
of credit counseling for their membership; this is usually provided through union
operated credit unions. Union Survey.
Unions can also encourage members discharged because of garnishment to seek
recourse through grievance procedures. See Aero Mechanic, Dec. 11, 1967, at 4, col. 3
(a union newspaper published by District Lodge 751, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO). An analysis of arbitration cases shows that arbi-
trators order reinstatement of employees discharged for garnishment in about half
the published cases. Generally, the arbitrators apply three tests: 1) Was the dis-
charge rule reasonable and well publicized? 2) Was the discharge nondiscriminatory?
3) Were there any extenuating circumstances favoring the worker? Usually a rule
providing for discharge after the first garnishment is held unreasonable. See Fisher,
How Garnished Workers Fare Under Arbitration, MONTHLY LABOR REv., May, 1967,
at 1-6. See also note 88 supra.
Unions may also protect their members' interests by lobbying in Congress and
state legislatures; they have been active in lobbying for restrictions on wage gar-
nishment. Union leaders have testified for this purpose before Congress. (See, e.g.,
Hearings at 749 (testimony of I. W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers)), and
before the California State Assembly (Proceedings 60 (testimony of Don Vial, Call-
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apparently feel obliged to remain "neutral" in a garnishment action
and refrain from giving any advice on garnishment laws to their
employees. Less than a third of the employers interviewed inform
their employees of the availability of wage exemptions, although a
few will tell an employee about the exemption if he specifically
requests this information! °6 Notwithstanding the above, knowledge
of the wage exemption is apparently becoming more widespread, per-
haps because of an influx of employees from states where wage
exemptions are more meaningful. 11 7
Even if an employee is aware of the wage exemption, the cost
and nuisance involved in claiming the exemption is another factor
working against its use. An employee working day shift in the indus-
trial complex south of Seattle will have to take time off from work,
procure transportation for the five to fifteen mile trip to the court-
house, and, if he wishes to defend on any ground, pay $1.50 filing fee
in order to claim his exemption."0 8 The cost and nuisance, perhaps not
fornia Labor Federation)). The Washington State Labor Council has passed a
resolution urging the state legislature to enact reforms in wage garnishment prac-
tices, Washington State Labor Council, Res. No. 52 (Aug. 31, 1967), and union
leaders have testified before the Judiciary Committee of the State Legislative Coun-
cil suggesting that garnishment be abolished. Minutes at 2 (testimony of Mrs.
Lorraine Wojahn, Wash. State Labor Council).
However, unions are rarely successful in efforts to insert a provision into the
collective bargaining contract limiting an employer's right to discharge an employee
whose wages have been garnished. In fact, some union contracts specifically recite
the employer's right to discharge for garnishment. See, e.g., Brunn, supra note 106
at 1229-30; 45 Ky. L. J. 322, 330 (1956). Of the Seattle area unions interviewed, only
one had even attempted to negotiate for a provision limiting discharge, and that at-
tempt failed. Union Survey.
Thus, where they potentially could have great impact in face-to-face negotiations
with employers, unions have been unsuccessful in significantly alleviating the problems
which wage garnishment poses for their membership. Fortunately, as a group they
have shown themselves to be both more aggressive and more effective in the public
arena, providing information and lobbying for legislative change-admittedly a tradi-
tional area of expertise for unions and perhaps their forte on issues such as wage
garnishment.
Generally, union representatives are not satisfied with Washington's present garn-
ishment provisions. In the union survey, 92% of the union representatives believe the
present wage exemption is inadequate; 83% favor an automatic exemption; 76% favor
abolition of prejudgment garnishment; but only 48% favor abolishing wage garnish-
ment completely (20% expressed no opinion).
Unions generally feel that discharge for garnishment smacks of employer inter-
ference with an employee's private life. Fisher, supra at 1. 72% of the union repre-
sentatives interviewed in the Seattle area favor abolishing discharge for garnish-
ment. Union Survey. Interestingly enough, 60% of the Seattle collectors sampled
agreed with them. Collector Survey.
" Employer Survey.
17 Interview with officials of the Boeing Company, supra note 72.
"o In addition, he runs the risk of confessing judgment in the office of the clerk.
Of the 9 cases of prejudgment garnishment in which exemptions were claimed the
debtor confessed judgment in 6. See Appendix, Table 6. When debtors appear at the
office of the clerk, they are often asked whether they wish to confess judgment. It
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determinative in itself, may become significant when combined with
other factors that discourage use of the wage exemption.
A person whose wages have been garnished prior to judgment has
a choice between alternative courses of action. First, he can ignore
the judicial system, go to the creditor's or collector's office, and nego-
tiate a new note or payment schedule covering the debt. The collector
usually with then move to discharge the employer-garnishee, thus
releasing the debtor's paycheck; the action on the underlying debt,
however, will be continued to judgment.' Alternatively, rather than
negotiate with the creditor, the debtor can claim his exemption, and
wait for the debt to be reduced to judgment. If he does so, the
creditor, of course, will not release his wages. The apparent advantage
of the second alternative is that the costs and fees added to the
original debt are subject to the court's scrutiny, while if negotiations
take place in the collector's office the debtor may become obliged to
pay collection charges that would not be authorized by a court."0
This advantage, however, is outweighed by severe disadvantages.
If he chooses not to negotiate with the creditor the debtor can
immediately recover, at most, the amount of the statutory exemption.
If the garnishment caught two weeks' pay, the exemption allows a
debtor with three dependents to retain one hundred dollars;"'. he
will not receive the remainder of his paycheck for at least twenty
days,'1 or as much as sixty days if he chooses to assert a defense at
trial.113 For a person supporting a family one hundred dollars is
hardly adequate to cover two weeks' expenses without incurring more
debts or skipping payments to other creditors." 4 The inadequacy of
the amount of the exemption is clearly an additional reason why few
would be interesting to know whether those who confess judgment realize the legal
significance of their action.
Confessions of judgment in Washington are governed by WAsH. REv. CoDE§§ 4.60.010-.070 (1956). WASH. REV. CODE § 4.60.040 (1956) reads as follows:
Confession, how made. The confession and assent thereto shall be in writing
and subscribed by the parties making the same, and acknowledged by each
before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds.
As a practical matter, all judgments by confession in justice court garnishment
actions are subscribed by debtors in the clerk's office.
'"' See note 60 supra and accompanying -text.
'"'See text accompanying notes 56 through 59 supra.
"WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967), quoted supra note 30.
"'In justice courts the return date can be set a maximum of twenty days after
filing. WAsH. Civ. R.J. CT. 4(b). The normal procedure is to set the return date at
the twenty day madmum.
"'See Judge Patterson's foreword to this project.
nUSee note 86 supra; Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and
Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. Rmv. 1214, 1228-29 (1965).
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wage exemptions are claimed. Quite simply, the creditor can offer a
better deal. By negotiating with his creditor immediately, the debtor
can recover his paycheck within two or three days after it is garnished,
although he may be required to pay the first installment on the re-
newed obligation.' The low wage exemption in Washington, then,
discourages a debtor's recourse to the courts and places him in an
unequal bargaining position with his creditor.
In municipal courts throughout the country a high number of de-
fault judgments are commonly entered." 6 The justice courts of King
County are no exception. In 55.6 percent of. the garnishment actions
surveyed the main action on the debt resulted in a default judgment.'17
Alienation and frustration of debtors toward the legal system may
partially explain the high incidence of default." 8 An additional ex-
planation may be the combined effect of inadequate wage exemptions
and prejudgment garnishment. The debtor is encouraged to respond
to the legal action solely by negotiation with the creditor, while the
creditor lets the main action run to default so that judgment will
stand as security for the renegotiated obligation." 9
A more serious question is whether prejudgment garnishment, by
coercing debtors to negotiate with their creditors, also precludes the
assertion of valid defenses at trial. A study in New York showed
that default judgments were obtained in 95 to 99 percent of cases
brought against low-income consumers, and that more than one-half
of the defendants believed that they were victims of consumer
fraud."' ° Although the Legal Services Division of the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity in Seattle is concerned about defenses lost in pre-
" See text accompanying note 59 supra.
See, e.g., 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759, 768. A survey of cases filed in Los Angeles
Municipal Court reveals that answers to the complaint were filed in only 8% of
1,743 cases, and that 50.5% of the cases resulted in default judgments. Hearings 1036.
Another study in New York indicates that over 97% of the cases brought by several
Harlem merchants and 73.5% of the cases brought by Macy's, a large New York
department store, ended in default judgments. Installnent Sales: Plight of the Low-
Income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 9 (1966), citing Schiffer, Default
Judgments in the New York County Civil Court 12 (Sept. 1965).
"' Appendix, Table 3.
"' See note 153 infra.
"'See text accompanying notes 60, and 111-115 supra. However, it is unlikely
that the number of defaults would decrease substantially if prejudgment garnishment
were abolished and the wage exemption raised, because the majority of the actions
are based upon debts which are due and owing, and for which the debtor will not
make an appearance. Cf. 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759, 768.
"o LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, THE POOR
SEEK JUSTICE 15 (1967).
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judgment garnishments,' 21 it is unlikely that the problem in Seattle
has yet reached the magnitude observed in New York.
The problem of employee discharge has already been alluded to.'22
Even if an employee is not fired for the first garnishment, one garnish-
ment will put an employee in serious trouble; his other creditors may
view a wage garnishment as a danger signal of impending job loss or
bankruptcy and themselves institute garnishment actions. 2
Once fired because of wage garnishments a debtor may find it im-
possible to hold a steady job. When he applies for a new job, the
job application forms will certainly inquire about the reason for his
previous termination, and may specifically ask whether his wages have
previously been garnished. 24 Further, while a debtor is out of work
and looking for a new job, other debts will become past due, and a
person fired for a wage garnishment usually will not have savings to
tide him over a period of unemployment.'25 When he finally resumes
employment a debtor may be subjected to further wage garnishments
by his more shortsighted creditors-often with the result that he is
fired again. 2 The debtor may thus find himself in the middle of a
vicious spiral of steadily increasing debts and decreasing income.
A person may be caught in this trap if his source of income is
temporarily cut off for any reason. For example, the following case
was related by Estes Snedecor, an Oregon referee in bankruptcy: 127
Just the other day I had a bankrupt in court whose back was broken 3
years ago in an industrial accident. For over 2 years he and his family
had existed on compensation from the Industrial Accident Commission.
Then for six months or more on job training he became skilled for tech-
'-'Interview with Mr. Charles Ehlert, Seattle Legal Services Center, Feb. 23,
1968.
See text accompanying note 79 supra.
Brunn, supra note 114 at 1228-29.
See Aero. Mechanic, Dec. 11, 1967, at 4, col. 3. See also Proceedings 63 (testi-
mony of Mr. Don Vial, California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO) quoting from a
letter received from a union member:
Well, they attached and they got $80.00 or $90.00 and I got fired. Since last
April I have not been able to get any kind of job in my field because they all
checked and Dow [Dow Chemical Company, his former employer] says I was
fired because of a wage attachment and the prospective employer treats me like
I had ten tails and I think it is a stinking mess.
'A study of garnished debtors in Wisconsin reveals that their family's net
income averaged about $90 a week. 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 767. "Most of the persons
in debt have little savings," George Katona, Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michi-
gan, reported in Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
1 "Studies have shown that some of the hard-core unemployed are, in fact, unem-
ployable because they have garnishment records." Hearings at 662 (testimony of Mr.
David Caplovitz).
" Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregonf, 40 REP. J. 78, 79 (1966).
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nical indoor work. Very soon after he obtained full time work and was
released by the Accident Commission, his salary was garnished and being
unable to maintain his family and meet the debts of his past misfortunes
he resorted to bankruptcy in order to obtain a new start in life. It is not
unusual for a collection agency to garnish the wages of some handicap-
ped person trying to earn his living at the Good Will Industries in
Portland.
Wage garnishment has a similar impact on welfare recipients. A study
in Milwaukee of 634 general relief families who went off welfare dur-
ing the months of October, 1964, and May, 1965, revealed that 23.3
percent had their wages garnished by February, 1966.128 Almost a
quarter of these were garnished within two to four weeks after return-
ing to work, and another quarter were garnished within three months
after returning to work. For many of these families garnishments
"proved to be the final straws that broke the backs of their marginal
subsistence and put them on welfare again, either through loss of job
or loss of incentive to continue working. 1 2 9 It is a fundamental para-
dox of our society that we spend billions of dollars trying to help the
poor through welfare programs, while maintaining collection laws
which make it difficult for them to hold a steady job.
Many people seek to avoid the effects of wage garnishment by
quitting their jobs before their wages are garnished; 3 " a few have
been driven to suicide by wage garnishment and its attendant prob-
lems;131 but by far the most common method of attempting to avoid
the welfare/unemployment trap threatened by wage garnishments is
bankruptcy. Although it is difficult empirically to prove a direct cause
and effect relationship, most authorities now agree that there is a
correlation between the rate of personal bankruptcies and the exemp-
tion of wages from garnishment.13 2 Referees in bankruptcy have
" Huber, Installment Credit Problems Amnong Welfare Recipients, in Hearings at
1027-31.
' Id.
' See note 46 supra.
'" "As you know, there have been many, many suicides reported in this country
because of the garnishment laws." Hearings at 743 (testimony of Willard Wirtz,
Sec. of Labor). For accounts of suicides related to garnishment, see Wall St. Journal,
March 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6; Hearings on S. 750 Before a Subconma. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 866 (1964).
'-Hearings at 794 (statement of Willard Wirtz, Sec. of Labor) :
I would agree that considerable evidence supports a conclusion that there is a
correlation between consumer bankruptcies and wage garnishments. Our exam-
ination of the subject shows that there is a widespread opinion among judges,
lawyers, economists and bankruptcy referees that there is a correlation.
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described wage garnishment as "the most important" or "the one and
only primary cause" of personal bankruptcies.'33 States which have
abolished wage garnishment definitely have a lower bankruptcy
rate,13 4 and states which exempt from garnishment 80 to 90 percent
of a debtor's wages also appear to have lower bankruptcy rates, al-
though here the correlation is not so striking,' perhaps because the
fear of job loss is a more significant cause of bankruptcy than the
current loss of wages garnished.
Although a correlation between garnishment provisions and bank-
ruptcy rates may be conceded, opinions differ about what conclusions
should be drawn. Some creditors contend that "blaming bankruptcies
[on] garnishment laws is like blaming traffic tickets on speed lim-
its."'36 But this formulation overlooks the fact that many debtors
who could pay their bills if given an opportunity essentially are driven
by wage garnishment or the threat of wage garnishment to file bank-
ruptcy.37 Personal bankruptcies seldom leave any assets for distribu-
Id. at 726 (testimony of Prof. Vern Countryman) :
To this I would like to add my own opinion, based on discussions with many
Referees in Bankruptcy and bankruptcy attorneys, and on the examination of the
files in hundreds of bankruptcy cases, that wage garnishment, either actual or
threatened, is a precipitating cause in a very substantial number of personal
bankruptcy cases.
In addition to the authorities cited in note 45, supra Professor Countryman also
cited BROSKY, A STUDY OF PERSONAL B3ANKRUPTCY IN THE SEATTLE METROPOLITAN
AREA 39 (1965), and MISBACH, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
UTAH 33 (1964), in support of his conclusion. Probably as a result of this and other
similar testimony, the subcommittee reported the following conclusion to the House:
The limitations on the garnishment of wages adopted by your committee...
will relieve countless honest debtors driven by economic desperation from plung-
ing into bankruptcy in order to preserve their employment and insure a contin-
ued means of support for themselves and their families.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1967). But see, Herrmann, Causal
Factors in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Case Study 32. (Institute of Govt. Affairs,
U. of Cal., Davis, Occasional Paper Series No. 6 (1965)), where after a study of 74
cases the author concludes, "It is difficult to determine the extent to which fear of
wage garnishment motivated the choice of bankruptcy."
Commentators in law reviews have generally asserted a relationship between wage
garnishment and bankruptcy. See, e.g., Brunn, supra note 114 at 1234-38; Conard,
An Appraisal of Illinois Law on the Enforcement of Judgments, 1951 U. ILL. L.F.
96, 101; 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 761-62.
" Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618, 630
(1967); Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 REF. 3. 37, 38 (1961) ; See
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1967, at Cl, col. 5.
"' See, e.g., Hearings at 794 (statement of Willard Wirtz, Sec. of Labor);
Snedecor, supra note 133.
"See Hearings at 726 (testimony of Prof. Vern Countryman).
' Letter from John W. Johnson, Executive Vice President, American Collectors
Association, to the Washington Law Review, Jan. 22, 1968.
'n See Snedecor, supra note 127, at 79:
Now, what disturbs me most, is that our garnishment law affords these young
people some justification for wiping out their debts in bankruptcy. Many of them
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tion to creditors. 38 To the extent that fear of garnishment results in
initiation of bankruptcy by people who would otherwise be able to
pay, the losses borne by creditors and the administrative costs borne
by the public are unnecessary.
Another opinion suggests that present high bankruptcy rates are
the result of outmoded bankruptcy laws. 3 "1 If any legislative change
is to be made, it has been suggested that the Bankruptcy Act be
amended so that the major avenue of relief for a distressed debtor
becomes the wage earner plan, 4' whereby creditors' claims are satis-
fied out of future earnings pursuant to a court approved plan of
composition or extension. Ordinary bankruptcy would be permitted
only after a determination that the debtor could not hope to pay his
debts.' 4 ' Employers, however, dislike administering wage earner plans
as much as they detest wage garnishments; 142 some are now asking
prospective employees on job application forms whether they have
ever declared bankruptcy.1" 3 If state garnishment laws could be
amended so as to reduce unnecessary bankruptcies without imposing
additional burdens upon employers, it would certainly be preferable.
The above discussion has assumed that bankruptcy is a viable
avenue of escape from frequent garnishments and the consequent
inability to hold a steady job. There are indications that this is not
so. Many debtors reaffirm obligations discharged by bankruptcy. 4
Finance companies are often successful in avoiding discharge of their
claim if the debtor neglected to include a complete list of his debts on
the statement he filled out when applying for a loan. 4' There are
even indications that some creditors are particularly eager to extend
come to me after court is over to say that they would have been able in time to
pay their just bills if they had been given an opportunity, but repeated garnish-
ments had prevented them from holding steady jobs. Our present laws are
causing them to lose their sense of obligation.
"Between 1953 and 1962, only 13% of the straight bankruptcy cases in the United
States were "asset" cases in which there were assets available for creditors. In these
cases, general creditors recovered an average of only eight cents on the dollar. Coun-
tryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 1452, 1453-54 (1964).
.. See Reed, Study of Personal Bankruptcies in Oregon Indicates Need for Change
in Bankruptcy Laws, 21 PERS. FIN. L.Q. RP. 56 (1967).
"'Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, as amended, §§ 601-86, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-86 (1958). For a description of the provisions and procedures of Chapter
XIII, see Consuiner Credit Syimposinn: Developments in the Laz, 55 Nw. U.L.
REv. 301, 372-81 (1960), and sources cited at note 8 therein.
.. Reed, supra note 139 at 58.
1' Interview with officials of the Boeing Company, supra note 72.
... Aero Mechanic, supra note 124.
... Brendes & Schwartz, Schlockmeister's Jubilee: Bankruptcy for the Poor, 40
REF. J. 69 (1966).
145 Id.
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credit to persons who have previously filed bankruptcy, simply because
these people are not allowed a second discharge for six years.146 Most
important, however, is the reluctance of some employers to hire per-
sons who have gone through bankruptcy. 4 7 Thus bankruptcy, even
from the debtor's point of view, often does not offer a solution to the
predicament posed by the threat of wage garnishment.
Some of the obstacles facing a person burdened with many debts
who attempts to rationally solve his debt problem have been outlined
above. But the solution of debt problems also has nonrational aspects.
If an irrational stimulus or "shock treatment" is necessary to stimulate
the payment of just debts by people who are able to pay, then this
treatment should be considered, for no credit-based economy can
operate successfully unless most people pay their debts. Reasoned
discussion of this consideration, however, is not furthered by creditors
who use the terms "deadbeat" and "credit criminal."' 48 Insofar as
those terms connote a person who draws credit with no intention of
repaying and who carefully exploits every weakness in the collection
laws to frustrate his creditors, the terms refer to an insignificant
minority of debtors.149
Rather than calculating ways to avoid repaying their debts, most
people who pose collection problems drift into debt trouble through
lack of planning. Only some of these people in serious debt trouble
will be influenced by the "shock value" of an imminent garnishment.
For this reason a consideration of possible reforms of wage garnish-
ment should attempt to sketch profiles of some of the most recurrent
types of debtors.
One type of debtor who frequently poses a collection problem has
been identified in studies of welfare recipients and low income resi-
dents. 1 0 Perhaps as a result of constant exposure to advertising,
these people develop a desire for consumer goods they cannot afford.
Lured by promises of easy credit and low down payments, they buy
goods with little or no conception of the interest rates or even of the
monthly payments. 5 ' There is some indication that these people will
"'Cf. id. The six year prohibition is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 35(c) (1964).
This attitude was occasionally mentioned in interviews with creditors, some of
whom accused their competitors of catering to bankrupts.
"7 See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
"SJordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. &
Com. L. Riv. 441, 457 (1967).
"'See Brunn, supra note 114 at 1245.
' See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
'See, e.g., Huber, supra note 128 at 1030.
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buy so long as the goods are offered, on either legal or illegal terms. 15 2
There is no indication that garnishment laws change this mode of
behavior. Garnishment may cost them their jobs and reinforce their
alienation from the law,' but it will not stop them from buying.
A different type of credit problem arises when a change in circum-
stances upsets the calculations of a debtor. A typical problem in
Seattle concerns people who come to Seattle during a Boeing Company
expansion program. These people may find themselves working for
wages above those to which they are accustomed, particularly if they
initially receive a substantial amount of overtime pay. Encouraged
by this salary increment, they may buy many consumer goods on
credit, only to discover that the cost of living in Seattle is higher than
they expected and that Boeing, its particular expansion program com-
pleted, no longer has overtime work available.' Similar problems
confront newly married couples attempting to learn the fundamentals
of managing their income while making the large initial purchases of
furniture and appliances.
Once such people have undertaken more obligations than they can
afford, they normally react in one of two ways. Many, realizing they
have overextended themselves, attempt to slowly work their way out
of debt by cutting down on credit purchases while making smaller
payments to their creditors. A garnishment at this point, by an over-
anxious creditor, may "kill the goose" by driving the debtor into
bankruptcy.
The alternative reaction to a debt problem is to ignore it com-
pletely.""5 The debtor may ignore collection letters, phone calls, and
"'CAPLOVITZ supra note 150 at 191 warns against imposing too stringent controls
on ghetto merchants because they may be forced to eliminate "easy credit" plans:
ghetto residents would then take their business to peddlers, who are even more diffi-
cult to control.
' 'A most unfortunate side effect of the garnishment system is that the courts
often become the "enemy" in the eyes of the poor. They become further convinced
that the society which they come to know as the "system" only works against them
and grinds them down.
Hearings at 813 (statement of Mr. Pat Greathouse, Vice President, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, AFL-CIO).
"' Interview with Mrs. Pat Greiner, Personnel Dept., the Boeing Company, July
14, 1967.
""!'his appears to be a common psychological reaction which we won't attempt
to explain. One psychiatrist has analyzed the reactions of the compulsive borrower in
terms of "'The Creditor Game" and the "Try and Collect Game." E. BERNE, GAMIES
PEOI'ILE PLAY (1966). See also Neifeld, The Credit Drunk, 20 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP.
56, 57 (1906). While these terms may be descriptive of the behavior patterns of some
debtors, they do not provide an adequate explanation of the reasons these patterns exist.
Some of the "apathy" among low income debtors may be caused by their ignorance
ot where to get help, by the difficulty of getting help once they know where to go, or
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all other attempts of a creditor to contact him. For these people wage
garnishment may be "an unfortunate form of reality therapy."1 56
It has not been shown, however, that this "therapeutic" value would
be lessened by eliminating those aspects of garnishment which impose
needless burdens on society.
Only a small percentage of American debtors pose serious collection
problems. The majority of these will probably attempt to pay their
past due debts irrespective of the garnishment laws. Others, particu-
larly ghetto residents, pose more basic problems which garnishment
only aggravates. Still others are too hopelessly in debt for garnish-
ment to make a difference. It is only the remainder with whom we are
concerned-those who are influenced to pay their debts solely by the
threat of wage garnishment, or those for whom the actual garnishment
serves as "reality therapy." For these people a collection device with a
shock value or coercive effect may be required. But the goal of
reform in this area of the law should also be to reduce the costs to
employers, the misery and frustration of the debtor who cannot hold
a steady job, the costs to creditors resulting from bankruptcy which
are passed on by creditors to the consumer, the increased costs to
welfare and unemployment compensation programs, and the additional
administrative costs resulting from massive increases in the caseloads
of our bankruptcy and municipal courts, all or which result from our
present wage garnishment provisions.
V. Tm-E EFFECT OF WAGE GARNISHMENT UPON AvAILABILITY
oF CREDIT
In most discussions considering legislative revision of garnishment
laws considerable attention has been given to the possible effects that
a restriction of wage garnishment would have upon the amount of
credit granted in the economy. These discussions, although important,
have proved inconclusive. Three different arguments have been made
concerning the relationship between wage garnishment and the avail-
ability of credit:
1) Creditors argue that restrictions on wage garnishment as a
remedy will have the immediate effect of raising the number of uncol-
by the feeling that they have been cheated by a merchant, and that the only way to
retaliate is to obstinantly do nothing. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 150 at 171-72.
'We are indebted to Mrs. Pat Greiner, of the Boeing Personnel Dept., for this
very descriptive term. Interview, supra note 154. These behavior patterns were also
mentioned by creditors and collectors during interviews, but usually creditors merely
dismissed the debtors exhibiting them as "deadbeats."
19681
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
lectible debts, thus forcing creditors to restrict the granting of credit
by eliminating marginal risks. This in turn would affect the economy
adversely by reducing the number of sales." 7 In support of this argu-
ment creditors often point to Texas, contending that interest rates
have increased and the extension of credit has decreased as a result
of that state's abolition ot wage garnishment.1 58 As yet, these allega-
tions have not been documented. On the other hand New York, which
recently raised its wage exemption to exempt 90 percent of a worker's
wages from garnishment,"' is not reported to be undergoing any
serious disorientation in its credit system.
2) Some commentators take the opposite point of view, urging that
the restriction of wage garnishment has no effect on the granting of
credit. The calculations offered in support of this proposition, how-
ever, are not sufficient to prove its validity."'
3) Others argue that a restriction of creditor remedies is one way
to eliminate abuses in the credit system. These commentators believe
" See, e.g., Proceedings 15 (testimony of Mr. Robert Kopriva, Associated Credit
Bureaus of California) :
I feel that if we make more exemptions in our laws, what would actually happen
is that the people that are entitled to credit would be unable to get it because the
credit grantor, who has to be concerned about his receivables, if he is unable to
effectively make his collections, is not going to be able to grant credit.
" Letter, supra note 137:
Texas does prohibit garnishments, in effect, and that provision has greatly
reduced the recovery rate on past due accounts. It means that creditors must
suffer bigger losses, must deny credit to a larger percentage of tthe population,
or must have a higher markup for all those who pay their bills.
The Texas prohibition of garnishment is contained in TEXAS CoxsT. art. 16, § 28.
'. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAWS & RULES §§ 5231(e), 6202 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
"c The view that extension of consumer credit is unrelated to garnishment laws was
advanced by George Brunn, supra note 114 at 1240-42.
In support of this position Mr. Brunn set out a table (id. at 1240-41 n.146) pur-
porting to show the ratio of the amount of installment credit to the amount of retail
sales in 1963 for seven states with varying garnishment laws. The resulting ratios
vary from 24.4 to 25.5, with no correlation to the type of garnishment law. Unfor-
tunately, the dollar amount of each state's installment credit was estimated by
dividing the nation's total installment credit by each state's percentage share of the
nation's total retail sales. (The installment credit figures were taken from Proceed-
ings, App. A at 2 (letter from Robert C. Kopriva, Legislative Chairman, Associated
Credit Bureaus of California)). When estimates of installment credit derived in
this manner are used to arrive at the ratio by state of installment credit to retail
sales, the result, mathematically, should be a constant, i.e., the ratio of the nation's
total installment credit to the nation's total retail sales. The only reason for any
variation in the ratios calculated by Mr. Brunn must be that he and Mr. Kopriva
used different sources for the retail sales figures.
Mr. Brunn uses the same installment credit figures to arrive at state ratios of
installment credit to personal income. (Id. at 1241 n.149) The way in which the
installment credit figures were derived, however, casts doubt upon the usefulness of
this exercise, particularly if it is assumed that a state's garnishment laws could
affect its ratio of installment credit to retail sales.
The comparisons which Mr. Brunn makes between retail sales and personal in-
come, and per capita personal income by state with state garnishment laws appear to
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that a restriction of garnishment will affect the granting of credit only
by eliminating credit overextension. 6 '
If the extension of credit to persons who will almost certainly be
unable to pay 6 2 can be discouraged by restricting collection remedies,
the law will achieve a desirable goal without an adverse economic
impact on creditors as a whole. A creditor is just as unable to collect
if the debt is discharged in bankruptcy as he would be if his collection
remedy were cut off. However, creditors evidently do have a problem
collecting from some people who could at least partially repay their
obligations, but who choose, instead, to ignore their debts. If credit
is denied these people because garnishment is unduly restricted, an
unnecessary brake may be put upon the economy as well as an unwar-
ranted hardship upon the members of this group who would be unable
to obtain credit. The ideal legislative solution would be to tailor col-
lection law so as to force the debtor to repay what he can afford
while leaving him the funds and the opportunity to continue function-
ing as a productive member of the economy.
VI. JUDIcIAL LIMITATIONS ON WAGE GARNISHMENT
A. Review of the Main Action
Under Washington's present garnishment laws the "full power of
the state is available to the creditor"' who alleges a debt is "just,
be accurate. However, considering the many factors which could affect personal
income, these comparisons probably do no more than disprove the more extravagant
claims by creditors that a restriction of garnishment will have dire effects on the
economy.
This analysis would be a useless exercise if Mr. Brunn's ground-breaking article
had not been receiving considerable attention throughout the country-attention it
rightfully deserves. However, the temptation to consider the relationship between
garnishment laws and the granting of credit a closed question (see, e.g., 1967 Wis.
L. REv. 759, 763) should be avoided.
.C See, e.g., Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & Comr. L. REv. 441, 448 (1967); Murphy, Proposed Consumer Credit
Legislation, 48 CHI. B. REc. 157, 165 (1967). But see Curran, Legislative Controls
as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. I~m. & Com. L. Rxv. 409, 431
(1967): "Care must be taken, however, not to characterize the problem as one
arising out of harsh creditor remedies when it essentially stems from abuses occurr-
ing in the process of bargain and exchange."
"A flagrant example of overextension of credit can be found in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), where a merchant sold
a $514 stereo set to a woman with seven children whose only income was her $218
stipend from the government, and who already owed the merchant in question $164.
" Jordan & Warren, supra note 148, at 457:
The full power of the state is available to the creditor to enable him to collect
his debt once he has obtained a judgment. The ability to use the courts as col-
lection agencies no doubt has encouraged some creditors to induce debtors to
incur more debt than they can actually manage.
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due and unpaid." The fact that courts have become unwilling adjuncts
to creditors in the collection process is not unique to Washington.
Courts of limited jurisdiction throughout the country are being
swamped with collection cases. 4 While judges resent creditors using
their courts as collection agencies,""5 they cannot individually alleviate
problems arising from the structure of the law rather than from its
application.
The majority of judgments in justice courts are obtained on default
of the defendant-debtor. 6 The judge, faced with a standard form
complaint which provides little information other than the amount of
the claim, can make no real determination of the merits of the case.
He can exercise discretion only when assessing the amount of costs to
be added to the original obligation. Although the costs awarded may
be less than those the creditor requested, these costs may still be
substantial. Assessments for attorney's fees, interest, and service
accounted for thirteen percent of the total amount of the final judg-
ments in the justice court survey.' These fees are a major source
of income to collection agencies.
In the justice court cases surveyed, the average amount allowed for
attorney's fees was $15.42. The most common allowance was $5.00
for "reasonable attorney's fees," but in many of the bad check cases
and suits on notes to finance companies, attorney's fees of $25.00 or
more were allowed. 6 As collection agencies usually complete stan-
dard form complaints and writs of garnishment, which are then signed
by a retained attorney and filed in groups of ten or more,"' these
attorney's fees may not represent money actually paid to counsel."'
The average amount allowed for service of the complaint and notice
"'See note 6 supra; Note, Small Claims Courts as Collcction Agencies, 4 STA-,'.
L. REv. 237 (1952) ; Kronheim, Does the Small Claims Branch of Our Municipal Court
Mcasurc Up to the Standards of the Community?, 18 J.B. Ass'N. D.C. 113 (1951).
"All of the justice court judges interviewed are dissatisfied with the present
state of affairs, even though some of them are sympathetic to the problems of cred-
itors. Interview, note 54, supra. See also, Kronheim. A Judge Takes A Critical Look
at the District of Columbia Garnishment Law, 12 PERs. FINv. L.Q. REP. 41 (1958).
"c See Appendix, Table 3.
"See Appendix, Tables 3 and 7. In addition, a defendant is usually assessed
$5.50 for filing and library fees.
"See Appendix, Table 7. For a discussion of attorney's fees on bad checks, see
note 178 infra and accompanying text.
... The docket books in the office of the clerk, Seattle District Justice Court, con-
tain numerous groups of from ten to twenty consecutive cases brought by the same
plaintiff.
70Judge Lewis, Seattle District Justice Court, points out that costs awarded by
the court can be a significant source of income to collectors who handle cases on a
volume basis. Interview, note 54 supra. But see 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 767, where
it is assumed that court awarded costs represent actual expenses incurred by collectors.
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of suit was $5.11.1'1 Theoretically, these charges represent actual
expenses incurred by a collector who must pay a process server. Many
large collectors, however, serve their own process.1 7 2 The service fee
charged supposedly varies with the mileage travelled to the debtor's
home;1 73 however, there are indications that this requirement is not
strictly followed. 7 4 Creditors often serve the writ of garnishment on
the employer at least three or four days before serving the complaint
on the debtor. 7 5 Since many debtors come to the creditor's office
immediately after their wages are garnished, the debtor is served in
these cases at slight expense.' 7"
Nevertheless, when considering costs that are awarded, it must be
remembered that Seattle district justice courts evidently do not allow
separate assessments for collection charges or their equivalent. For
this reason, service and attorney's fees may be necessary sources of
income to offset other items of the collector's overheadY.7 7 However,
the fees allowed in many bad check cases, which may double or even
triple the amount of the check, seem completely unjustified. The
Washington legislature has made this field so lucrative that there are
many new collection agencies which deal entirely in bad checks and
rely solely for their income upon these extravagant statutory collection
costs, attorney's fees, and interest.'7 8
"'See Appendix, Table 7.
"-2 In the Collector Survey, collectors were asked if they served their own process;
of those sampled 8% said "yes," 52% said "no," and 40% refused to answer. The lat-
ter figure was the highest nonresponse rate for any question on the questionnaire. Thejustice court judges, and attorneys at the Seattle Legal Services Center and the
Washington State Attorney General's office all agreed that some of the larger collec-
tion agencies in Seattle do, in fact, serve their own process.
1WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.84.090 (1956), requires that the fees allowed for service
by a private party be "the same as is now allowed... as fee and mileage to an officer."
WAsH. REv. CODE § 36.18.040 (1963), governs service fees allowed for service by a
sheriff, and allows a basic fee of two dollars plus ten cents a mile.
"During compilation of the Justice Court Survey, it was noted that one collection
agency was allowed $6.00 for service in the majority of cases it brought.
"See note 97 supra.
'0Judge Patterson in the foreword to this project states that creditors serve the
writ of garnishment first so that the debtor will come to them, saving them the
trouble of having to find him. See p. 736. It is not known whether or not the debtor is
then served in the creditor's office and charged a service fee based on the mileage to
his home. However, demands for service fees not based on mileage were recorded in
very few cases in the Justice Court Survey.
" It should also be noted that creditors lose filing fees and service expenses when
an action is initiated and the debtor cannot be found. Of the cases in the Justice
Court Survey, 17% were dismissed for lack of service, and it is likely that creditors
suffered losses in the majority of them.
Ch. 23, § 1, [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws Ex. Sess. 1954, allows interest at the rate
of 12% per annum, a collection charge equal to the amount of the check but not to ex-
ceed $20.00, plus reasonable attorney's fees. The collection charge is evidently included
under the heading of attorney's fees on the justice court dockets, thus resulting in a
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Thus it is apparent that courts exercise little control over the
operation of wage garnishment as it now exists. The judiciary might
be able to use the tort of wrongful garnishment to limit the use of
garnishment. Or it might be argued that the constitutional require-
ments of due process and equal protection invalidate the present use
of wage garnishment prior to judgment.
B. Wrongful Garnishment
Liability for wrongful garnishment may be predicated upon the
common law tort of malicious prosecution or abuse of process,179 or
upon statutory actions against garnishment or attachment bonds.
Although wrongful garnishment may seem to be a viable sanction for
defendant-debtors against abuse from collectors, in practice it is an
uncertain remedy.
The Washington cases imposing liability appear to be based upon
statutes requiring creditors to post garnishment and attachment bonds.
There is no statute providing an action for wrongful garnishment:
however, the section that requires garnishment bonds conditions their
return upon plaintiff's payment of damages "that may be adjudged
against him for wrongfully suing out such garnishment."' This
statute makes no mention of probable or reasonable cause for the suit.
The Washington statute providing for actions on attachment bonds
requires that the plaintiff show "that the attachment was wrongfully
sued out, and that there was no reasonable cause to believe the ground
upon which the same was issued to be true .... "',l The Washington
Court recognized this variation in statutory language,8 2 and in actions
for wrongful attachment has required a showing of both lack of prob-
able cause and wrongful suing out of the writ,"'8 while in actions for
wrongful garnishment liability has been predicated solely upon proof
that the writ was wrongfully sued out.'5 4
$25.00 attorney's fee in most bad check cases. The above act supersedes WASH. REv.
Comr § 62.01.300 (1965) which allowed 61A interest and "reasonable" collection and
attorney's fees in bad check cases.11"Comment, Creditor's Liability in Texas for Wrongful Attachment, Garnish-
ment. or Execution. 41 TrXASs L. R Fv. 692, 693 (1963).
WAsii. REv. CODE § 7.32.020 (1956).
'WAsii. REV. CODE § 7.12.080 (1957).
"-'The two causes of action are discussed in Olsen v. National Grocery Co.,
15 Wn. 2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942).
Bromn v. People's Nat'l Bank, 39 Wn. 2d 776, 238 P.2d 1191 (1951).
Olsen v. National Grocery Co., 15 Wn. 2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942); Knight v.
Bishop, 51 Wn. 2d 353, 318 P.2d 323 (1957); Maib v. Maryland Casualty Co., 17 Wn.
2d 47, 135 P.2d 71 (1943).
In the rare situation in which a creditor first executes an attachment bond and
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The Washington court has had few occasions to discuss the mean-
ing of "wrongful" in a garnishment action. It is clear that a judgment
for the defendant in the main action on the debt is conclusive evidence
of wrongful garnishment,'85 but it is not clear what test will be applied
if the underlying action is not prosecuted to final judgment.'86 A
suggested test has been whether a reasonable and prudent businessman
would believe the debt was just, due and unpaid."' However, a similar
test is also used to determine whether there was probable cause,"'8
and use of the same test to determine what is "wrongful" would nullify
the statutory provision that eliminates a requirement of probable cause
from wrongful garnishment actions. Nonetheless, it is 'difficult to
formulate a less stringent test which could be practically applied.
Actions in justice courts present a particularly difficult aspect of
wrongful garnishment. It should be recalled that most wage garnish-
ments involve small claims brought in justice court. 89 The statutory
requirement of a garnishment bond does not apply in actions in justice
courts for amounts under $300.'10 Therefore, in most cases there is
no statutory basis for a wrongful garnishment action. Further, the
common law actionfor malicious prosecution requires a showing that
the suit was brought with malice and without probable cause,'' al-
though some courts have dispensed with these requirements in allowing
common law actions for wrongful garnishment.'92 The common law
then resorts to garnishment, lack of probable cause will probably be required to
maintain an action for wrongful garnishment, because in most instances the suit will
be upon the attachment bond. The court has held that once an attachment bond is
executed, an additional garnishment bond is not necessary to procure a writ of
garnishment. Paltro v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 119 Wash. 101, 204 P. 1044(1922).
"m Olsen v. National Grocery Co., 15 Wn. 2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942); McGill v.
W. P. Fuller & Co., 45 Wash. 615, 88 P. 1038 (1907).
"s It is obviously more difficult for the defendant to bring a successful wrongful
garnishment action if the action on the underlying debt has not gone to judgment.
For this reason, if plaintiff feels he is going to lose in the underlying action, a good
tactic would be to move to dismiss. However, if the motion to dismiss comes after
the plaintiff has rested his case, defendant might be able to avoid dismissal without
prejudice or to condition the dismissal in some way so that it will serve as evi-
dence of a wrongful garnishment. See WAsH. Civ. R. SuPEP CT. 41. Another tactic
to counter a motion to dismiss would be to counterclaim for wrongful garnishment
in the original pleadings.
'Comment, Creditor's Liability in Texas for Wrongful Attachment, Garnish-
ment, or Execntion, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 692, 697 (1963).
amId.
a' See Appendix, Table 1.
' WAsr. REv. CODE § 12.32.015 (Supp. 1967).
... See, e.g., Vesper v. Crane Co., 165 Cal. 36, 130 P. 876, 878 (1913); Malone v.
Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913); W. PROSSER, TORTS 874-75 (3d ed.
1964).
"'See, e.g., Peterson v. Wiesener, 62 Nev. 184, 146 P.2d 789, 793 (1944); Lukens
v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Kan. 937, 101 P.2d 914, 918 (1940).
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action for abuse of process does not require a showing of lack of
probable cause; but some "wilful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding" is required. 193 Again,
some courts have dispensed with this requirement in allowing common
law wrongful garnishment actions under the heading, "abuse of pro-
cess."1 04 In short, by whatever name it is called, there is substantial
authority allowing a common law action for wrongful garnishment
predicated solely upon a "wrongful" bringing of the action.'9 5 It
would seem that the Washington court, rather than perpetuating a
meaningless distinction between claims under $300 and those over that
amount, should adopt this common law basis of liability for wrongful
garnishment in the justice courts.
While the action for wrongful garnishment appears in theory to be
a viable check on abuse of the garnishment process, it shares the com-
mon shortcoming of much of the legislation and many of the common
law rules available for the protection of the consumer-it depends
upon individual initiation of legal action. The principal defendants,
particularly in the justice courts, commonly do not have the time,
money, knowledge, or inclination to hire an attorney and pursue what
is, at least at the justice court level, an uncertain remedy. In addition,
even if the wrongful garnishment action were completely effective in
eliminating the abuse it was designed to prevent, i.e., garnishment
pursuant to an invalid claim, the remedy cannot be expected to curb
the other social costs of wage garnishment, i.e., the coercive effect of
having wages withheld, job losses, and the rising incidence of bank-
ruptcy.
C. Due Process
Recent criticisms of Washington's garnishment statute raise the
question whether prejudgment garnishment violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.'
Essentially, procedural due process requires that deprivation of
property be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard.'9 7
" PROSSER, supra note 191, at 877.
' Id.
',' See cases cited note 192 supra.
"'
3 Minutes at 3 (testimony of Mr. Charles Ehlert, Assistant Director of the
Seattle Legal Services Center, and Judge Mark T. Patterson, Everett District
Justice Court).
'See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
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If under Washington practice prejudgment garnishment is a depriva-
tion of property, there clearly is neither adequate notice nor oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to the garnishment.19 However, if it is not a
deprivation of property there is probably sufficient notice199 and op-
portunity to be heard 0 0 prior to the actual "deprivation" which pre-
sumably will take place at judgment.0 1
Perhaps due to the time-honored position that garnishment holds
in our legal traditions, 20 2 few courts have considered the "deprivation"
question. Those which have reached the issue conclude that garnish-
ment prior to judgment is not a deprivation of property in the consti-
tutional sense, primarily because the deprivation is "temporary" and
"conditional," depending for finality upon reduction of the underlying
claim to judgment.2 0 3 The United States Supreme Court has not con-
sidered the issue.20 4 Considering the expansive definitions promulgated
by some courts of what constitutes property and the deprivation there-
(1950); Senior Citizens' League, Inc. v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn. 2d
142, 168, 228 P.2d 478, 492 (1951).
" The writ of garnishment is usually served upon the employer before the notice
of suit is served on the debtor. See note 97 supra.
"WASH. IEV. CODE § 12.04.040 (1925), requires service of the complaint and
notice of suit at least five days before the date set for the defendant to appear. This
would appear to guarantee adequate notice of the underlying action. New York has
experienced some incidence of fraudulent or "sewer" service, particularly in cases
involving installment sales. Installment Sales: Plight of the Low-Income Buyer,
2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1 (1966). Although the files of the Seattle District
Justice Court reveal a high number of defaults and a number of affidavits of service
reciting service only at the "abode" of the principal defendant-both of which might
be warning signs of fraudulent service-the judges are of the opinion that collectors
will sometimes omit the address only in an attempt to keep this information from
other creditors of the defendant. Interview with Judges Starr, Hoar, and Lewis,
Seattle District Justice Court, Aug. 18, 1967.
' However, if the defendant is precluded from asserting a defense at trial for
financial reasons, due process questions may arise. See discussion in text accompa-
nying note 215 infra.
" The cases dealing with whether garnishment is sufficient notice of the under-
lying action are not directly relevant. See, e.g., Albright-Prior Co. v. Pacific
Selling Co., 126 Ga. 498, 55 S.E. 251 (1906) ; Spoturno v. Woods, 38 Del. 378, 192 A.
689 (1937). However, these cases may be apposite insofar as they contain an underly-
ing assumption that no notice is required for the garnishment itself, because implicit
in that assumption is the proposition that garnishment is not a deprivation of prop-
erty requiring notice.
"[Garnishment proceedings] are truly blue-blooded legal institutions that can
claim a family tree reaching back into the Middle Ages." Mussman & Riesenfeld,
Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 Mirir. L. Rxv. 1, 8 (1942).
The court in McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd, 279
U.S. 820 (1928), relied heavily on this pedigree .when deciding that garnishment is
not a deprivation such as contemplated by the Constitution.
"' McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd 279 U.S. 820
(1928); Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932).
'In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924),
the Court held that a prior judgment constitutes sufficient notice and hearing for a
garnishment in execution of that judgment. Implicit in the decision is a holding
that garnishment in execution of a judgment is a deprivation of property that re-
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of,2°  and the fact that there is no overriding social interest (interests
similar to those which support restrictions of property interests in
police power cases) in granting creditors this "extraordinary" remedy,
the due process argument is at least worthy of attention. However,
in view of the courts' past treatment of the issue, due process as a
judicial limitation on the remedy of prejudgment garnishment is
speculative at best.
D. Equal Protection
While Washington's garnishment provisions permit seizure of the
wages of all defendants prior to judgment regardless of financial
status, the operation of these provisions essentially denies the poor
any opportunity to present defenses to main court actions. Recalling
previous discussion, up to two weeks' wages are normally caught by a
prejudgment garnishment. If the defendant chooses to assert a defense
at trial, these wages will not be released until after the trial, which
may occur two to three months after the writ of garnishment is
served. -°0 On the other hand, if the debtor makes satisfactory arrange-
ments with the creditor, his wages will be returned immediately.0 7 It
would seem that prejudgment garnishment in Washington requires the
equivalent of filing a one hundred dollar bond before the right to
quires notice and a hearing. However, unlike a garnishment in execution, the per-
manency of a garnishment before judgment is dependent upon a subsequent judgment.
In Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), the Court approved the garnishment of a
debt owed to the principal debtor even though the principal debt had not been reduced
to judgment. However, in Harris, as well as in cases upholding the attachment of
tangible property as a basis for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, the principal
debtor was outside the jurisdiction, and the attachment or garnishment was used
primarily as a means of subjecting the principal debtor or at least his property to
the jurisdiction of the court. In a prejudgment wage garnishment, however, the
principal defendant is rarely outside the jurisdiction, and the garnishment is not a
symbolic seizure subjecting the property to the jurisdiction of the court. Rather, the
garnishment is a very real seizure of what is often the principal defendant's only
means of livelihood, and its effect is most often not to coerce him into the jurisdic-
tion, but to force him out of the courts and into the creditor's office for a non-judicial
determination of the claim.
'See, e.g., Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 at 702:
The legal right to use and derive a profit from land or other things is prop-
erty.... And the power of disposition at the will of the owner is property.
Deprivation does not require actual physical taking of the property or the thing
itself. It takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power
to dispose of it at will is affected.
But although attachment may within the broad meaning of the preceding
definition, deprive one of property, yet conditional and temporary as it is .... we
do not think it is the deprivation of property contemplated by the Constitution.
'See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
'See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
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assert a defense at trial can be exercised. °8 This requirement effec-
tively forecloses access to the courts for many debtors who cannot
afford a delayed paycheck.
In criminal cases the Supreme Court has struck down fee limitations
on the right of appeal, °0 on the ability to procure transcripts for
appeal,210 or on the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.211
In Griffin v. Illinois the Court stated:
Surely no one would contend that either a state or the Federal Gov-
ernment could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay
court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty or
to defend themselves in court.... Notice, the right to be heard, and the
right to counsel would under such circumstances be meaningless prom-
ises to the poor.2 12
The Court has not yet faced these issues in a civil case.213
The conditioning of access to the courts upon payment of money
may run afoul of two constitutional prohibitions. First, insofar as the
requirement results in unequal treatment of classes of defendants
based upon their ability to pay, the procedure may violate the equal
protection clause.214 Second, it is possible that the opportunity to be
In cases where employers answered that wages were due, the average amount
due was $151.26. See note 36 vtpra. Even if the employee did claim his wage
exemption in all cases, it is unlikely that many would be eligible for the full $100
($50 per week) exemption-either because a full two weeks wages were not caught,
or because the employee does not have three dependents. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967), quoted supra note 30. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that the average garnishment which catches anything will catch $75 to $100 of non-
exempt wages. The amount sought in the main action will usually exceed this
amount (see Appendix, Table 1), so that a debtor who chooses to bring an action to
trial will usually have to do without $75 to $100 of his wages for a period of two or
three months.
- Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
"' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
212351 U.S. at 17.
"2In Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), it was held that the courts of the
District of Columbia could not, under the due process clause, suppress the answer of
a defendant (ordered to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt)
and enter a decree in default against him because he failed to post a $49,000 bond.
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The full implications of Griffin are still not clear.
"When nine men split four ways and no opinion has the complete support of any five,
I humbly submit that the implications are a matter for a Delphic oracle...." Qua,
Griff n v. Illinois, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 143, 147 (1957).
Some members of the Court refuse to accept the proposition that a state may
violate the equal protection clause by adopting a law of general applicability which
in actuality affects the poor more harshly than it does the rich. See Justice Harlan
dissenting in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360, 361-62 (1963). Even members
of the majority in Griffin evidently do not agree on its impact in civil cases. See
Justice Douglas' dissent from denial of certiorari in Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S.
1037 (1967), noted in 20 STAN. L. REv. 766 (1968).
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heard guaranteed by the due process clause 2 1 5 as with other constitu-
tional rights,21 may not be conditioned upon affluence. These issues
were raised in a recent case arising under the Georgia summary evic-
tion statute. 7 The Georgia statutes require that in order to remain
in possession of the property and to obtain a trial the tenant must
post a bond to secure costs. After the Georgia court declared the
controversy moot,21" the tenant petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court denied the petition.219 Justice Douglas
in a dissenting opinion stated that "the Equal Protection Clause .. .
is not limited to criminal prosecutions." 220 He argued the applicability
of analogous criminal cases.
The potential impact of Griffin and its progeny if applied to civil
cases is enormous. 2 2  All requirements of licensing fees and bonds
could conceivably run afoul of the equal protection clause. Perhaps
for this reason the Court has been reluctant to expand equal protection
requirements in civil actions. Judicial limitation of prejudgment gar-
nishment under the equal protection clause, then, is just as unlikely
as under procedural due process. Rather than reliance upon the pos-
sibility of what are perhaps unwise expansions of constitutional doc-
trines, a more certain and desirable method of eliminating the evils
of prejudgment garnishment would be statutory reform.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Wage garnishments impose heavy burdens on employers, debtors,
and society as a whole in the form of expenses to employers, high
bankruptcy rates, and the reinforcement of unemployment and des-
211 U.S. Co.sT. amend. XIV.
"'"See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12, Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S.
1037 (1967):
[Jiust as the exercise of such basic rights as free speech, [Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)] the right to travel from-one state to another, [Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)] the right to vote [Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)] or the right to counsel [Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)] cannot be conditioned on affluence, neither
may the right to defend in a civil action....
217 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967). Citations to the relevant Georgia
statutes are contained in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion.
211sWilliams v. Shaffer, 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1037 (1967). The tenant asked for a declaratory judgment and that the landlord be
enjoined from evicting him. As the tenant had already been evicted the Georgia
court declared the controversy moot.
-11385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
- 385 U.S. at 1039.
Some of the commentary on the potential impact of Griffin is listed in Com-
ment, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and its Progeny, 16
STA N . L. REv. 394, 396 (1964).
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pair. These burdens outweigh the concurrent benefits provided credi-
tors by the availability of the remedy. This imbalance has led many
observers to recommend the abolition of wage garnishment, 2 2 and
some states have followed this advice. 2
Wage garnishments directly affect only a small number of con-
sumers. The delinquency rate on installment credit has been estimated
to be between one and two percent.224 Legal actions are probably filed
in less than 10 per cent of these delinquent accounts.225 To deal with
this small group of bad debts, "... creditors have gained a vast arsenal
of remedies. 226 Credit information on millions of Americans is now
being stored in computers, and soon information on every person who
has ever purchased an item on credit will be instantly available to any
potential lender.2 7 A man's credit rating will mean much more than it
ever has in the past. Collectors have available increasingly sophisti-
cated prelitigation collection devices, in addition to an impressive array
of legal devices such as chattel mortgages, wage assignments, and at-
tachments and execution levies against numerous forms of property.22
In Washington, however, the number of alternative remedies availa-
ble to creditors is not so large. Homesteads are generally exempt from
attachment or execution,22 as are numerous items of personal prop-
erty. 0° Employers are not required to accept wage assignments of
under $300.231 The judgment note, a device used frequently in Penn-
sylvania where wage garnishments were abolished in 1845,232 is not
available in Washington.33 Aside from wage garnishment there is no
2See, e.g., Kronheim, supra note 152; Satter, An Argument for Abolition of
Wage Attachment, 52 ILL. B.J. 1026 (1964).
'Florida has abolished wage garnishment of resident heads of families. FLA.
STAT. §222.11 (1965). Pennsylvania and Texas do not allow any garnishment of
wages. PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 42, § 886 (Supp. 1966) ; TEXAS CoNsT. art. 16, § 28.
"'Proceedings, App. A (letter from Robert Kopriva, Associated Credit Bureaus
of California).
'See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
-Riesenfeld, Collection of Money J.tdgments in American Law-A Historical
Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REv. 155, 181 (1957).
' See Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility
of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoxrEmp. PROB. 342, 371-76 (1966).
'See Brunn, supra note 114 at 1242-43; Comment, Garnishment of Wages in
Pennsylvania: Its History and Rationale, 70 DicK. L. REv. 199, 211 (1966).
'WASH. REv. CODE §§ 6.12.090-.100 (1956).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.020(3) (1965) exempts household goods, appliances
and furniture up to $1000 in value; provisions and fuel to comfortably sustain a
householder and family for three months; and up to $400 in other property.
='WASH. REv. CODE § 49.48.090 (1958).
='Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transac-
tions, 8 B.C. IiN. & CoM. L. REv. 535, 537 (1967).
' In Washington, a confession of judgment is surrounded by strict procedural
requirements. See note 108 supra.
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practical means of insuring execution of a judgment on a small loan, a
small debt incurred for services, or on liabilities resulting from credit
card transactions or bad checks. -34 If judgments on this type of credit
become impossible to execute, creditors may restrict 235 or eliminate
the granting of credit in many of these transactions.
The impact of abolishing wage garnishment upon the granting of
credit has not been documented. -36 Creditors, like debtors, often react
to wage garnishment in an irrational manner, and any prediction as to
how they would react to an abolishment of wage garnishment is provi-
sional at best. Therefore, a complete abolition of wage garnishment may
only replace the present social costs with other, though perhaps lower,
costs resulting from the real or imagined burdens placed on creditors.
For these reasons, rather than abolishing wage garnishment com-
pletely, an attempt should be made to modify the garnishment laws so
as to eliminate the high social costs now resulting from wage garnish-
ment without eliminating collection remedies for any significant type
of credit now being granted. In Washington, this would require a
substantial revision of the garnishment laws.
There are a number of ways this necessary revision could be ac-
complished. Because many of the policy considerations necessitating a
revision of garnishment laws are unique to wage garnishment, we
recommend an approach to statutory revision similar to that used in
Illinois.
In 1961 the Illinois General Assembly adopted a new act relating
solely to the garnishment of wages. As a result, Illinois now has two
separate garnishment procedures-one applicable only to wages, and
one covering garnishment of all other property.237 Thus, after exclud-
ing wage garnishments from RCW § 7.32.010 and § 12.32.010
(Grounds for Issuance of Writ) it is recommended that the following
changes be incorporated into one chapter covering the garnishment of
wages in both justice and superior courts.
"' Interview with Mr. Pat Corbett, Esq., July 7, 1967. Mr. Corbett, when ques-
tioned about abolishing garnishment, indicated that he could conceive of no other
way of executing judgments in Washington if wage garnishment were abolished.
' Increasing interest rates is not really a viable alternative for creditors, because
interest rates are extensively regulated in all states. See generally B. CURRAN,
TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965).
"
6 See note 160 supra; Hearings at 742 (testimony of Willard Wirtz, Sec. of
Labor) : "You can't find the resultant effect on credit. It is a hard thing to measure.
But I am willing to go along with the common sense suggestion that if you tighten
up on the use of this kind of practice it must have some effect on credit."
"7 See Prefatory Note to the Garnishment Act of 1959 and the U/age Deduction
Act of 1961 as Amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62 (Supp. 1967).
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A. Abolition of Garnishment Prior to Judgment
Commentators and judges have been particularly vocal in pointing
out the evils of prejudgment garnishment. 3 Even creditors are some-
what disenchanted with the remedy 239 In review, prejudgment gar-
nishment incorporates two significant evils. First, when used in a
jurisdiction with inadequate wage exemptions it coerces the debtor to
seek settlement with the creditor rather than be heard in court. The
debtor may thus become obligated to pay costs higher than those
which would be imposed by a court. 40 Second, this coercive effect may
cause debtors to forego valid defenses to the claim which they would
otherwise raise at trial.2-41 There is no indication that the remedy pre-
vents many debtors from leaving the jurisdiction,2 42 and garnishment
in execution of a judgment is equally successful in preventing the
conversion of wages into exempt property.
The abolition of prejudgment garnishment can be accomplished
either by inserting in the exemption statute a 100 percent exemption
of wages from prejudgment garnishment, or by incorporating it in a
separate section setting forth the grounds for which a wage garnish-
ment may be issued. In order to maintain consistency with Washing-
ton's other garnishment provisions, we chose the latter course and
recommend the following provision. 4
Grounds for issuance of writ. The justices of the peace, justice courts,
and superior courts may issue writs of garnishment for the garnishment
of earnings in the form of wages, salary, commission or bonus as com-
pensation for personal service only where the plaintiff has a judgment
wholly or partially unsatisfied in the court in which he seeks to have the
writ of garnishment issued.
B. Wage Exemption
Washington's wage exemption is inadequate. The national average
weekly wage of a production worker at the end of 1967 was $103.25.24
For an aircraft production worker this figure was $15 2.85.14a While
See note 65 supra.
See, e.g., text accompanying note 64 supra.
- See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 120, 121 supra and accompanying text.
"'See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
' The phrase, "earnings in the form of wages, salary, commission or bonus as
compensation for personal service," was suggested by Prof. Countryman for inclusion
in the "Truth in Lending" provision limiting garnishment (H.R. 11601, tit. II,§ 202). Hearings at 727.
-" MONTHLY LABOR REv., Feb., 1968, at 107 (figures for Dec., 1967).
"Id. at 111 (figures for Dec., 1967).
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it is estimated that the average family spends 85 to 90 percent of its
yearly earnings to satisfy current needs, -46 Washington's wage exemp-
tion is only $50 per week for a worker with three dependents; 24' a
figure now below the FLSA minimum wage.2 48 At today's cost of
living, Washington's wage exemption no longer guarantees a "living
wage" for the garnished debtor.
This low exemption forces a debtor to negotiate with his creditor if
he wants to avoid incurring more debts and dropping behind in his
payment of others. When negotiating with a creditor the debtor has
almost no bargaining power because he has no alternatives. With
other debts piling up, a debtor who does not negotiate must either
quit work or declare bankruptcy in order to avoid further garnish-
ments.
2 49
The present wage exemption appears to be a compromise between
providing a living wage for the delinquent debtor and punishing him:
but it accomplishes only the latter. The purpose of wage garnishment
should be to collect debts rather than to inflict punishment. It can
be argued that the only way the law can insure an honest attempt by a
debtor to repay his bills is to place him in such a financially difficult
position that he will be forced to stop consumption of "frills"; but the
more financially uncomfortable a debtor gets, the greater the risk that
he will file bankruptcy.25 0 There is no need to force a person into
poverty to collect a debt; in fact, from a broader point of view such
action is incomprehensible.
Before deciding the amount to which Washington's wage exemption
should be raised, there are two preliminary points to consider. First,
the new wage exemption should be expressed as a percentage. Exemp-
tions expressed in dollar amounts rapidly become outmoded with
changes in the value of the dollar, and require constant legislative re-
vision. As a result, at any given time the actual protection provided by
a dollar exemption is probably less than the legislature intended when
passing the exemption. 1 Second, the wage exemption should auto-
2" See note 86 supra.
.,7 WASH. REv. CODE § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967), quoted supra note 30.
" Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1938), as amended, 80 Stat.
838-40 (1966).
" See notes 130, 132 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 132-34 supra and accompanying text.
" See. e.g., Abrahams & Feldman, The E.xemption of Mfages From Garnishment:
Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DE PAUL L. Rav. 153, 161 (1954); Joslin,
Debtors' Exemption Laws; Time for Moderni.gation, 34 IIxD. L.J. 35-5, 361 (1959);
Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REv. 484, 497
(1961). It was noted that Kentucky's exemption of $67.50 per month exempted 100%
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matically apply. In Washington and other states without automatic
exemptions very few debtors actually claim an exemption.
25 2
Suggestions as to the amount of wages which should be exempt
from garnishment range from $3600 to $15,000 per year.2 3 Present
state exemption laws are "as individual as snowflakes,"25 4 and vary
from $30 a month to exemptions of 90 and 100 percent.2 5 5 As noted
above, present estimates indicate than an average family uses 85 to 90
percent of its income to satisfy current needs.250 In view of these esti-
mates we have chosen an 85 percent exemption.25 7 This exemption will
apply automatically, regardless of the debtor's yearly or monthly in-
come, and regardless of whether or not he has dependents.
Admittedly, this exemption will seem unfair when applied at both
ends of the income spectrum. A person with a large family earning
$3600 per year probably needs more than 85 percent of his income,
while a person earning over $15,000 a year probably needs less. How-
ever, the person earning over $15,000 a year is more likely to have
nonexempt property which can be levied upon, while the low income
person is more likely to incur the small debts for which wage garnish-
ment is the only means of execution. Placing a "floor" or "ceiling"
upon the exemption would only defeat our purpose of avoiding con-
stant legislative revision. The following provision incorporates these
recommendations:
Exemption of wages and other compensation. Eighty-five per cent of
net earnings in the form of wages, salary, commission or bonus as com-
pensation for personal service are exempt and are not subject to collec-
tion under a writ of garnishment. Any employer served with a writ of
garnishment as herein provided by this chapter shall pay the employee
the amount of his exempt earnings.
of the income of most employees when the statute was enacted, but by 1956 it
exempted less than 25% of the average employee's income. 45 KY LJ. 322, 329
(1956).
"'See note 103 supra.
'The $3,600 suggested exemption is contained in Karlen, Exemptions from
Execution, 22 Bus. L. 1167, 1171 (1967). Prof. Countryman rejected this suggestion
and proposed an exemption of $15,000 per year. Hearings at 728.
" Seid, Necessaries-Com,nmo or Otherwise, 14 HASTINGs L.J. 28, 33 (1962).
'A complete list of state wage exemption laws is contained in Brunn, supra
note 114 at 1250-53.
See note 86 supra.
' The 85% exemption was selected because it appears to be the lowest exemption
that would not create extreme hardships for the average employee; however, a bill
now before Congress as part of the "Truth in Lending" Act (H.R. 11601, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. tit.II, § 202(a)) essentially exempts 90% of a person's wages from garnish-
ment. If this bill is passed it will, by its terms, preempt all lower state wage
exemptions.
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As used in this section "net earnings" means the earnings remaining
after deductions for federal income tax and social security but before all
other deductions.
C. Notice to Debtor
Illinois has abolished prejudgment garnishment and raised its wage
exemption to 85 percent, and instituted a writ that continues for a
thirty day period .2 " As a result, in one large plant in the Chicago
area 10 percent of the 22,000 employees have a portion of their wages
withheld every payday to satisfy delinquent debts.2 5 ' While this cer-
tainly indicates that debtors are no longer being forced to negotiate
at a disadvantage with creditors, and that wage garnishments operat-
ing within a proper statutory framework can be an actual collection
device rather than a tool of coercion, these figures also point to a
potential burden on employers which may result from the statutory
reforms recommended thus far. One device which might reduce this
potential would be a notice and demand to the debtor prior to garnish-
ment. This could be presented in the form of a bill calling for
weekly or biweekly installment payments, thus giving the debtor a
realistic chance to pay a judgment on his own initiative-along with
a warning that his wages will be garnished if he does not comply. The
following statutory provisions could implement this recommenda-
tion : 0
N'otice to the jud.ment debtor. Prior to issuance of the writ of gar-
nishment on an employer, a notice shall be filed with the court from
which the judgment issued and served upon the judgment debtor order-
ing him to pay installments of not more than fifteen percent of his net
earnings until the amount of the named judgment unpaid is satisfied.
The notice shall also inform the judgment debtor that if the terms of the
notice are not complied with within twenty days, a writ of garnishment
may be served upon his employer.
Levy upon default of judgment debtor. If a judgment debtor fails to
pay installments pursuant to the notice described in R.CAV. (Notice to
the judgment debtor) served upon him for a period of twenty days, then
upon the filing by a judgment creditor of (a) an affidavit of service of
the notice upon the judgment debtor, (b) an affidavit stating that the
ILL. A NN. STAT., ch. 62, §§ 73, 74, 77 (Supp. 1967).
'Hearings at 768. The quoted figures were printed in 1966: the Illinois statute
was amended in 1961.
"The recommended provisions are based upon the procedure outlined in N.Y.
CIV. RILAc. LAWS & RULES §§ 5231 (b),(c),(d) (McKinney 1963). It is also suggested
that the form of this notice be prescribed by statute, because some creditors are
prone to incorporate extravagant threats into "statutory" notices.
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terms of the notice have not been complied with, and (c) an affidavit
that the affiant believes any person or entity is indebted to the judgment
debtor for wages due or to become due, as herein provided, a writ of
garnishment shall issue to be served upon the person named in the
affidavit as the employer.
D. Continuing Writ
If the recommended wage exemption of 85 percent is adopted, some
provision for a continuing writ that allows garnishment of future
wages is necessary. 61 A judgment debtor earning $100 per week may
only have $12 to $13 a week of non-exempt wages after deductions.
Without a continuing writ, several writs of garnishment would be re-
quired to execute even small judgments. Each writ imposes additional
expense upon the creditor and the employer, and increases the possibil-
ity of the debtor being fired. The average judgment amount in the
justice court survey was $215.19, although the modal amount was
somewhat lower. In order to ensure collection of a large portion of
this amount, a continuation of each writ for a period of 90 days is
recommended. The following provisions incorporate the recommended
continuing writ, as well as accompanying provisions for priority over
previous writs and for answer by the employer.
212
Effect of writ to create lien. To the extent of the amount due upon the
judgment and costs, the employer shall hold, subject to order of court,
"' See Note, State Wage Exemption Laws and the New Iowa Statute-A Compar-
ative Analysis, 43 IowA L. Rxv. 555, 567 (1958), where it is argued that Iowa's
new garnishment statute essentially depends upon the coercive effect of the threat ofjob loss for its utility, because the writ is effective for only one pay period. Iowa's
statute exempts only $35 per week plus $3 for each dependent under 18 years of age.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (Supp. 1966). But see Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's
New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618, 631 (1967), where it is argued that a con-
tinuing writ is not necessary in Kentucky, even though that state has a 75% wage
exemption. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 427.010(2) (Supp 1967). See also, Proceedings
20, 50, 88 (testimony of Mr. Kopriva, Mr. Weissman, and Mr. Conway) where three
representatives of creditors all recommended that some limitation on successive
writs of garnishment be adopted in California.
'The recommended statutory sections are based generally upon ILL. ANN. STAT.,
ch. 62 § 77 (Supp. 1967); however, the provisions for answer by the employer do not
follow the Illinois procedure. Illinois requires the employer to answer interrogator-
ies before the writ issues, and again after the writ runs out. It is felt that the
recommended procedure will require somewhat less paperwork of the employer.
The Illinois statute also provided that the writ would run for 30 days. This was
changed to 90 days for the reasons stated in the text.
The section on priority of writs is intended to avoid any further requirement that
an employer "split" checks. If two or more writs were allowed to be effective against
exempt wages, the check would probably have to be "split" by a clerk, rather than
prepared on the normal payroll computer run.
The forms for the writ of garnishment and the answer have not been included.
It is recommended that forms akin to those set out in WASH. REv. CODE §§ 12.32.
040, 100 (1967) be included in the chapter.
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any non-exempt wages due or which subsequently come due. The judg-
ment or balance due thereon is a lien on wages due at the time of service
of the writ, and such lien shall continue as to subsequent earnings until
the total amount due upon the judgment and costs is paid or until the
expiration of the employer's payroll period ending immediately prior to
90 days after service of the writ, whichever first occurs, except that
such lien on subsequent earnings shall terminate sooner if the employ-
ment relationship is terminated or if the underlying judgment is vacated
or modified.
Answer of employer. The employer shall answer on or before a date
fifteen days after service of the writ stating whether the judgment debtor
is employed by him. If the answer is affirmative, a second answer shall
be made on or before fifteen days after the lien on the judgment debtor's
non-exempt wages terminates by operation of R.C.W. (Effect of writ to
create lien) stating the amount of non-exempt wages held. The answers of
the employer shall be in writing and signed and shall be served upon the
judgment creditor and filed with the clerk of the court issuing the writ.
Priority of writ. A lien obtained hereunder shall have priority over
any subsequent lien obtained hereunder. Any writ served upon an
employer subsequent to a previous writ on the same wages covering the
same payroll period is void, and shall be returned by the employer with
an answer stating when the previous lien will terminate.
E. Limitation on Discharge for Garnishment
The more oppressive long range effects of wage garnishment are
related to discharge for garnishment. Studies have shown that some
of the hard-core unemployed are unemployable because they have
garnishment records. -63 It is fear of job loss, more than anything else,
which influences debtors to declare bankruptcy. -4 The same fear also
motivates a debtor who quits his job rather than have his employment
record blemished. 6 5
A state can abolish prejudgment garnishment and raise its exemp-
tion, but when the writ is served, the fact that it came after judgment
and that 85 percent of his wages are exempt is little consolation to the
debtor if he loses his job.2 6 Illinois eliminated prejudgment garnish-
ment and raised its wage exemption, but the state's bankruptcy rate
still remained high. -67  Wage garnishment's effect upon unemploy-
See note 126 supra.
"3 See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
'See note 46 supra.
'See Murphy, Proposed Consumer Credit Legislation, 48 CHI. B. Rlc. 157,
165-66 (1967): "A second difficulty of exemption statutes, no matter how generous
to the employee, is that a deduction order is still a black mark fo the employee....
'Between 1961 (when Illinois raised its wage exemption to 85%) and 1964,
personal bankruptcies in Illinois declined 9% while they were increasing 18%
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ment and bankruptcy rates can only be cured by abolishing the
remedy, or by restricting discharge for garnishment.2 6 Wage garnish-
ment should not be completely abolished, but a limitation upon dis-
charge for garnishment is essential to any complete statutory reform.
The most rational reasons supporting employers discharging for
garnishment are to avoid bookkeeping and related expenses, and to
avoid poor work performance resulting from worry about debts.269
If the garnishment laws are modified to eliminate prejudgment gar-
nishment and provide advance notice to debtors, the number of gar-
nishments will probably decrease, or at least remain constant. If the
necessity for splitting checks is eliminated, bookkeeping costs will be
reduced. The work performance of a debtor who does not have to fear
losing his job or being unable to meet currrent expenses will probably
not deteriorate. If a complete revision of the garnishment laws can
thus reduce the expenses to employers caused by garnished employees,
the impact of a restriction of the right to discharge will be reduced.
It has been argued that such a law would be unenforceable. This
argument can be answered in two ways. First, it can be assumed that
most large manufacturers, who receive the bulk of garnishments, will
make a good faith effort to obey the law if passed; therefore, providing
the discharged debtor a civil cause of action against the employer
would probably be sufficient, even though such private enforcement
mechanisms are rarely effective. Second, if the legislature is seriously
concerned about enforcement, the State Attorney General could be
given power to enforce the provision with criminal penalties for its
violation. George Brunn, in his work on wage garnishment, 70 argues
that the example of the National Labor Relations Act's prohibition
of discharge because of union membership2 71 shows that such a pro-
vision can be enforced.
nationally: and they declined another 4% between 1964 and 1966 while the national in-
crease was an additional 2%. However, Illinois still ranks eighth in the nation in per
capita personal bankruptcies. Hearings at 725-26 (testimony of Prof. Vern Countryman).
' An alternative solution to the problems of garnishment not heretofore men-
tioned is exemplified by procedures instituted in a few states whereby a court-
appointed trustee administers a debtor's nonexempt wages, allocating them among
his creditors; the debtor is usually protected from garnishment which participating
in a plan of this nature. There is a good discussion of these plans in Brunn, supra
note 114 at 1226-27. Mr. Brunn concludes that implementation of such a plan might
be viewed as too burdensome by the courts. It would appear to be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to implement such a procedure in Washington without also over-
hauling the administrative apparatus of the justice and/or superior courts on a state
wide basis to prepare for the influx of paperwork that such a procedure would entail.
' See notes 74, 78 supra and accompanying text.
'See Brunn, supra note 114 at 1232-33.
-' 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), 158(a) (3) (1964).
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In order to provide sufficient protection against discharge, it is
recommended that an employer be prohibited from discharging an
employee unless the employee has been garnished at least three times
within the previous twelve month period. Any writs of garnishment
which do not "catch" any wages because of the priority of previous
wages should not be included in the count of writs served within the
previous twelve months. This is necessary under present creditor
practice because an employee in debt trouble may initially be gar-
nished several times by creditors anxious to catch something before
the debtor is fired or goes into bankruptcy. The recommended pro-
visions requiring notice, raising the exemption, and limiting discharge
should alleviate this problem of numerous ineffective writs, and as a
result of the limitation on discharge, most garnished employees should
be secure in their jobs-anyone garnished four times within a year is
in such debt trouble that his employer could rightfully require that his
employee take remedial action.
The recommended provision is basically the same as New York's
statute limiting discharge, except that New York only prohibits dis-
charge for the first garnishment.272
Dismissal or lay off of employee to avoid compliance with writ of
garnishment.
1. No employer shall discharge or lay off an employee because a writ of
garnishment has been served upon such employer against the employee's
wages; provided, however, that this provision shall not apply if more
than three writs of garnishment, exclusive of writs not effective because
of priority of previous writs, have been served upon the employer within
any period of twelve consecutive months after (Date).
2. An employee may institute a civil action for damages for wages lost as
a result of a violation of this section within ninety days after such viola-
tion. Damages recoverable shall not exceed lost wages for six weeks and
in such action the court also may order the reinstatement of such
discharged employee. Not more than ten per centum of the damages
recovered in such action shall be subject to any claims, attachments or
executions by any creditors, judgment creditors or assignees of such
employee.
'N.Y. CIV PRAC. LAWS & RULES § 5252 (McKinney 1967). See Hearings at
666 (statement of Mr. David Caplovitz) :
Although eliminating garnishment is probably a desirable long-run objective.
I would urge the Committee to consider a more modest proposal now, the adop-
tion of a stronger version of the New York State law which prohibits employers
from firing employees because of garnishments. The New York law now applies
only to the first garnishment, but there is no reason why such a law should not
cover two or even three garnishments.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
We are no longer in an era where debt is an unusual catastrophe.
Buying on credit is now openly solicited by saturation advertising
campaigns and occasionally by questionable sales methods. Millions
of Americans have responded to the invitation to "buy now and pay
later." An unfortunate, but perhaps unavoidable, by-product of credit
selling has been the few who fall by the wayside-those, who for one
reason or another, do not pay their debts. Until recently the law has
treated these unfortunates with a sense of moral outrage, depriving
them of the goods they attempt to purchase, exacting interest, penal-
ties, collection fees, and legal fees from their wages until they event-
ually lose their jobs and face the modern equivalent of a debtor's
prison-a lifetime sentence of irregular employment, steadily mount-
ing debts, and the degradation of being a welfare recipient.
A debtor should not be treated as an unscrupulous deadbeat, but
rather as a casualty of our credit economy. To punish a debtor by
reducing him to a status in which he is a drain on society is not only
unfair, but foolish. The law has recognized the importance of giving
debtors a second chance to become productive members of society
through the Bankruptcy Act; the same philosophy is also embodied
in restrictions of wage assignments and confessions of judgment. But
it is only recently that the impact of wage garnishment has been scru-
tinized.
Wage garnishment in Washington defeats the purpose of many of
our other laws designed to give the debtor a second chance; the rem-
edy, as it now operates, is perhaps the last holdover from an era in
which debt was considered a moral wrong. People selling credit must
expect a certain amount of bad debts as a cost of doing business. To
allow creditors to inflict tremendous costs on society as a whole by
extracting every cent possible from debtors is self-defeating, from
both the legal point of view and, over the long run, the creditors' point
of view. The goal of the law should be to force the debtor to pay all
he is able to pay, while leaving him in a position to continue func-
tioning as a productive member of society.
The recommended changes in Washington's garnishment law go a
long way toward meeting this goal. The debtor is still forced to pay
his debts, but he is forced to do so without the specter of job loss or
completely inadequate income. Creditors may have to wait longer to
be paid, but this burden is at least partially offset by the reduced
19681
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possibility of a debtor losing or quitting his job, or going into bank-
ruptcy and thus stopping payment entirely. The burden upon em-
ployers is more difficult to measure; but the elimination of prejudg-
ment wage garnishment and the imposition of a notice requirement
should keep them from being inundated with garnishments. Whatever
costs remain are more than offset by the reduced burdens on society
as a whole.
C. Kenneth Grosse & Charles TV Lean*
* 3rd year law students, University of Washington.
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TABLE 2
TYPES OF ACTIONS
No.
Transcripts1  7 3.8
Executions 73 39.0
Double Actions2  107 57.2
TOTAL CASES 187
'These are executions on judgments entered in Justice Courts other than Seattle
District Justice Court and for which it was impossible to obtain complete information.
This term refers to garnishments instituted prior to judgment. Usually both the
garnishment and main action are filed simultaneously.
DISPOSITION
TABLE 3
OF CASES-MAIN ACTION
Type of Number of Total Average
Disposition Cases (%) Judgments Judgment
Default judgment 104 (55.6) $21,940. $211.
Confession of Judgment 16 ( 8.6) 3,871. 242.
Trial Judgment 13 ( 6.9) 3,110. 239.
No Service 32 (17.1)
Dismissal 9 4.8)
Other (Information
Incomplete) 9 4.8)
Judgment By Agreement 4 ( 2.1) 1,402. 350.
TOTAL CASES 187 (99.9) $30,323. $221.*
* Based on the number of cases (137) resulting in final judgment.
TABLE 4
DISPOSITION-PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENTS
Type of Number of Total Average
Disposition Cases (%) Judgments Judgment
Default Judgment 49 ( 45.8) $ 9,395. $192.
Confession of Judgment 8 ( 7.5) 2,344. 293.
Judgment By Agreement 4 ( 3.7) 1,402. 351.
Trial Judgment 5 ( 4.7) 1,418. 284.
No Service 32 ( 29.9)
Dismissal 9 ( 8.4)
TOTAL CASES 107 (100.0)1 $14,559. $221.
This figure suggests that 57.2/ of the 187 cases in the survey involved the use of
prejudgment garnishment. However, this table does not include executions on unsatis-
fied judgments which themselves involved earlier use of prejudgment garnishment.
The survey of Justice Court cases revealed that about 70% of all suits filed involve the
use of garnishment prior to judgment.
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DISPOSITION OF
TABLE 5
GARNISHMENT ACTIONS
Number of Total Average
Type cases (%) Amounts Amounts
Garnishee Defendant
Discharged 82 (43.7) $ .... $
Answer No Funds &
G.D.2 Discharged 32 (17.1) ........
No Service Discharge 3  33 (17.6) ........
G.D. Ordered to Pay 31(16.6) 2,545. 82.06
Default Against G.D. 8 ( 4.2) 606. 75.70
TOTAL CASES 1864(99.2) ........
'This category includes both cases in which the garnishee defendant (the employer,
in wage garnishment actions) answered with an amount owed the debtor and those in
vhich the garnishee defendant was discharged prior to answer.
' Garnishee Defendant
'No service upon defendant-debtor, resulting in the discharge of the garnishee de-
fendant
On 1 additional case, information was insufficient.
TABLE 6
EXEMPTIONS
TOTAL NUMBER 13 (7% of the 187 cases
in the sample')
TOTAL AMOUNT $940.00
AVERAGE AMT. 72.312
'Overall figures obtained from the Civil Clerk, Seattle District Justice Court con-
firm that exemptions are requested in only 6.5% of all garnishments. When debtors
appear at the office of the clerk they are asked if they wish to defend on all or any part
of the obligation. If they do, they must pay the $1.50 statutory fee. If they are uncer-
tain, no fee is charged and the obligation will run to default. If the debtor answers no
to possible defenses he is asked whether he wishes to confess judgment.
'The maximum exemption allowable per week under the Washington statutes is
50 dollars, for a debtor with 3 or more dependents. See discussion in text, at page 761.
Of these 13 exemptions, 9 (69%) arose in actions involving the use of
prejudgment garnishment. Of these 9 actions, 3 resulted in a trial judg-
ment; in the other 6, the debtor confessed judgment. As to the eventual
outcome of the garnishments in which exemptions were claimed: a dollar
amount was returned in 10 of the cases in an average amount of $123.98,
and in six of these cases the garnishee defendant was ordered to pay. In all
cases in which the garnishee defendant was ordered to pay, the order was
either for the full amount of the return or the full amount of the debt.
1969]
798 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 43: 743
TABLE 7
FEES
Number of Total Average Mlodal
Ty pe' Cases Allowed Amount Amount Amount
Attorney Fees 132 $2,036. $15.42 $5.002
Interest 76 1,386. 18.23 4.00-10.003
Service Fees 128 654. 5.11 6.001
'Filing and Library Fees are $4.00 and $1.50 respectively, and should also be in-
cluded in considering the total amount of fees in the typical case. Since they remain
constant they are not tabulated here on a per case basis.
2Deviation between the arithmetic average and the mode is primarily due to the
attorney fees allowed for bad checks, which are larger than the allowance for reason-
able attorney fees found in many simple contracts.
' In the interest category, deviation between mean and mode can largely be attrib-
uted to the frequency of actions on loans by finance companies. These notes provide
for a fixed amount of interest and a rate on default, and are for an average obligation
of $387.73, see Table 1.
' Deviation in this category can be attributed to differences in mileage traveled.
However, there are some questions as to the ethical nature of these service charges.
For a general discussion of this point, see textual discussion accompanying note 178
Su pra.
